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I. INTRODUCTION
Accidents happen. This familiar maxim is the ineluctable starting point
for any substantive disquisition concerning the law of products liability.
The difficulty, of course, is in deciding what to do when accidents happen.
If one accepts the proposition that the ultimate goal of tort law is to assign
responsibility for harm, the decision as to who should bear responsibility
when "accidents happen" is the ultimate question of products liability law.
Various legal theories have been devised over the centuries to answer
this ultimate question. Modem products liability law provides essentially
three paths to recovery: negligence, strict liability in tort, and warranty.
These are very different paths, indeed; the path taken often means the
difference between recovery and nonrecovery. And the paths themselves are
not always clearly marked: along the way are perilous secondary paths with
illogical pitfalls for the unwary. Why so many paths from which to choose?
Is there a logical or at least historical justification for their differences?
This article attempts to answer these questions. It concludes that neither
logic nor history can support the current framework and advocates the
construction of a single road, a unified theory of products liability, which
the author calls causative liability.
The shibboleth one employs is not particularly important. The important
point is that current products liability law is a patchwork of incoherent,
inconsistent, and inefficient intellectual rags that can and should be
discarded. As the American Law Institute (A.L.I.) ponders the future of
products liability in an effort to devise a Restatement (Third) of Torts, courts
must be given the flexibility to discard these moth-eaten, anachronistic,
intellectual rags and replace them with a new, tightly-woven fabric in which
to clothe products liability for the twenty-first century.
Before proceeding further, the reader may demand to know: What is
causative liability? Causative liability is a theory which holds that if X
causes harm to Y (in both a factual and proximate sense), X should be held
legally responsible. X is legally at fault even though he may have exercised
all due care. X therefore owes a duty to all individuals to refrain from
acting in a manner that causes them harm. Thus, no elaborate inquiry into
the questions of duty, the reasonableness of X's conduct, or defectiveness is
necessary.
Causative liability is not synonymous with absolute liability. X will be
held legally responsible only insofar as his actions were both the cause-in-
fact and proximate cause of Y's harm. Thus, Y's own actions, the actions
1278 [Vol. 61:1277
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of third persons, and acts of nature can all serve to reduce or eliminate X's
liability. Likewise, the retention of proximate cause principles permits
common sense and policy considerations to cut off X's liability when his
actions appear too attenuated to attribute legal responsibility to him.
To many readers, causative liability sounds a lot like strict liability. In
its pure theoretical form, strict liability is the equivalent of causative
liability. But the term "strict liability" has become so distorted as to be
unrecognizable. Today's strict liability-as the term is used in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts-is actually a hybrid of negligence and
causative liability, an intellectual No Man's Land devoid of logic or
consistency. Thus, the author has chosen to use the term "causative
liability" to distinguish it from the modem concept of strict liability and
prevent further intellectual distortion.
Perhaps an example can best illustrate the implications of causative
liability. Imagine that your neighbor decides to cut down a tree on his
property, and in the process, the tree lands on your house, causing great
damage. Your neighbor, in cutting down the tree, exercised all reasonable
care. Indeed, as he adamantly points out, he used the state-of-the-art
technique for cutting down a tree, employing only the finest chain saw and
cutting-edge cutting procedures. In so doing, no reasonable man could have
foreseen the damage to your house. Current tort law would hold your
neighbor to a standard of negligence, and you would not be able to recover.
Do you care whether your neighbor acted negligently or not? Probably not.
All you know is that your house is now a pile of rubble and that you are
stuck with the cost of rebuilding.
What does this hypothetical have to do with products liability? Change
the facts slightly, and the relevancy becomes clear. In the revised hypotheti-
cal, a person does not cause your injury, but a product. Imagine that you
are cutting down a tree in your yard, using a state-of-the-art chain saw
manufactured by XYZ Co. While you are exercising all reasonable care, the
chain saw suddenly and inexplicably malfunctions, sending the blade
through your left arm and severing it. Under current law, you have many
legal theories under which to prbceed. Assuming the chain saw conformed
with the design specifications of XYZ Co., your likely theories will include
negligent design,' res ipsa loquitur,2 strict liability in tort for design
defect,3 and implied warranty of merchantability.4
Because XYZ Co.'s design is state-of-the-art, you likely will not be able
to recover under either the negligent design or res ipsa loquitur theories. If
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (1965); see also Matthews v.
Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956).
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965).
3. See id. § 402A.
4. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1990).
12791994]
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the XYZ Co. has not disclaimed implied warranties, 5 you may be able to
recover under a warranty theory if you proffer evidence that the chain saw
was unfit for its ordinary purpose of cutting trees.6 Undoubtedly, XYZ Co.
will rebut with substantial evidence that it exercised care in the manufacture
and design of the chain saw.7 What of strict liability in tort for design
defect? Your ability to recover may hinge upon the test for defect employed
in your jurisdiction. If a risk/utility test is employed, you will not recover
unless you can establish that the malfunction was due to a characteristic of
the chain saw design that renders the chain saw so risky that it outweighs
the chain saw's overall utility.' In addition, in many jurisdictions, you will
have to proffer a safer alternative design that is economically feasible and
that does not diminish the chain saw's overall utility.9 Clearly, numerous
obstacles may prevent recovery under a risk/utility test of design defect.
Another possibility is that your jurisdiction employs a consumer
expectations test' ° of design defect. Under this test, you would be required
to prove that the chain saw failed to comport with the reasonable expecta-
tions of a chain saw consumer. Your chances of recovery under this theory
are markedly improved, as the jury would likely agree that most chain saw
purchasers do not expect their chain saws to malfunction without explana-
tion and sever a limb. Indeed, the consumer expectations test is virtually
synonymous with causative liability because reasonable consumers never
expect a product to cause them harm."
The point of the hypothetical is simple. Current products liability law,
particularly in the design defect context, is irrational and inconsistent.
Consumers injured by chain saws or any other product do not care whether
the manufacturer exercised due care or whether the product's overall utility
outweighs its risks. All they know is that the product hurt them. They did
5. See id. § 2-316(2)-(3).
6. See id. § 2-314(2)(c).
7. See id. § 2-314 cmt. 13.
8. See, e.g., Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980);
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979).
9. See, e.g., Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978). Contra
Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1987).
10. See, e.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806 (Or. 1967); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965) (defect is "a condition not
contemplated by the ultimate consumer .... ); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum
Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794 (Wis. 1975).
11. See James A. Henderson Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products
Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1295
(1991) [hereinafter Closing the Frontier]. Indeed, perhaps the only time a consumer truly
can be said to expect harm is when she assumes the risk of harm by a knowing and voluntary
encounter. See Moran v. Raymond Corp., 484 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 932 (1974); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965).
1280 [Vol. 61:1277
CA USA TIVE LIABILITY
not anticipate the harm, and they are innocent. They instinctively believe
that product manufacturers, like neighbors who cut trees, should abide by
the phrase, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.'2
Causally linked harm, however, is not sufficient for recovery under
current products liability law. In addition to cause and harm, the modem
products liability plaintiff must also prove the existence of a defect. The
modem strict liability theories-both in tort and in warranty-require proof
that the product is defective, either because it fails to comport with
consumer expectations or because its risks outweigh its utility. Negligence
also revolves around the notion of defect, but the focus is on defective
human behavior-i.e., lack of prudence-rather than the product itself. The
obsession with proof of defect as a prerequisite to recovery is unnecessary
and distorts the central inquiry of responsibility for harm, which is the very
heart of tort law.
Defectiveness has been the hallmark of products liability since its
incipiency as a distinct branch of tort law. However, it must be remembered
that products liability is the bastard offspring of negligence and warranty
law. Is it any wonder that products liability law has been saddled with the
legal baggage of its parents? In particular, design and informational defects
have been shepherded into the risk-utility test, undoubtedly a variation of
Learned Hand's B < PL test for negligence. 3
Why has a negligence analysis been adopted for design and failure to
warn cases? The reasoning likely goes like this: While a reasonable
consumer can look at a rat in a bottle and immediately discern negligence,
such discernment is not so readily obtained when viewing a tractor that
lacks a roll cage or a piece of metal that is excessively porous. When the
rat is found in the bottle (a so-called* manufacturing defect), the defect
bespeaks, nay screams, "Negligence!" Thus, the argument goes, one should
not have to prove that the manufacturer failed to exercise reasonable care
because the defect, in essence, speaks for itself. 4 In the case of a tractor
without a roll cage or a too-porous metal piece (so-called design defects),
the defect is invisible to the average consumer, necessitating a closer, case-
by-case negligence analysis. One is therefore required to prove that the lack
of a roll cage or excessive porousness was unreasonable.
12. "Use your own property so as not to injure that of another." See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1380 (6th ed. 1990).
13. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
14. It should be noted that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur ("the thing speaks for
itselC') represented an early bridge between pure negligence and modem strict liability.
Under this doctrine, plaintiffs enjoy an inference or presumption of negligence if they can
prove that the product remained in control of the defendant until the time of purchase and
that the accident which occurred does not normally happen in the absence of negligence.
See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944); Jakubowski v.
Minnesota Mining.& Mfg., 199 A.2d 826 (N.J. 1964).
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In either the manufacturing defect or the design/informational defect
scenario, the inescapable truth is that courts employ negligence, or more
precisely, fault, principles. The difference between these two doctrinal
categories, therefore, lies in the application of the fault principle, not in the
underlying principle itself. In either case, the fault principle is the same: a
products liability defendant is "at fault" if his actions fall below the level of
ordinary prudence or reasonableness. Legal fault, in the modem sense, is
therefore a moral judgment, not a causative judgment.
The difference, therefore, between manufacturing defects and design or
informational defects is that courts conclusively presume fault in manufac-
turing defect cases while requiring outright proof of negligence in fault and
informational defect cases. Why? The answer to this question is so simple
that it proves perplexing. Under modem tort law, the test for legal fault is
negligence. If negligence is the failure to exercise the care of a reasonable
person in like circumstances," then manufacturing defects are tantamount
to negligence per se. No reasonable manufacturer would ever place a
product on the market that failed to comport with its own manufacturing
specifications. This is so because the reasonable person is precisely what
that name implies-a reasonable person, not an overly cautious person or
a careless person, but a person of ordinary prudence. A person of ordinary
prudence, in turn, will adopt only those measures of quality control that are
reasonable under the circumstances (degree of risk, severity of injury, etc.)
and no more. Thus, the reasonable person is essentially free to establish his
own standard of liability for manufacturing defects. If he fails to conform
to his own specifications, he is, by definition, acting unreasonably; therefore,
liability for manufacturing defects, while often termed strict liability, is in
reality merely a form of negligence per se.
Design and informational defects warrant different treatment under
traditional negligence principles because in such cases the reasonable person
has acted in conformance with a self-imposed liability standard. Thus, the
reasonable person (whose product design or warnings are a fortiori
reasonable) does not (and indeed cannot) act negligently by placing a
product on the market that conforms to her reasonable design or warnings.
It necessarily follows that the reasonable person whose product conforms
with her inherently reasonable design or warnings will be held liable under
a design or informational defect theory only if the plaintiff can prove that
the reasonable person was not reasonable after all but was, in fact,
unreasonable because the product contained risks that outweighed its utility.
As just demonstrated, the underlying negligence principle of modem
products liability law has created a difficult and often unjust dichotomy
between manufacturing and design/informational defects. On the one hand,
a manufacturing defect is per se unreasonable, and the injured consumer is
entitled to compensation. On the other hand, a design or informational
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965).
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CA USA TIVE LIABILITY
defect is subject to specific proof of negligence before the injured consumer
may recover. This dichotomy is a direct consequence of adopting the notion
of "defect" as the sine qua non of recovery in products liability law.
The previous sentence will make many torts scholars nervous. Without
the notion of "defect," many believe products liability law would be forced
into an uncontrollable tailspin that would shatter the underlying basis of all
tort law.16 The result, many fear, of purging the word "defect" from the
products liability vocabulary is either an unworkable, ad hoc liability
standard or the Grim Reaper of torts law, no-fault compensation. As this
Article will show, such fears are unfounded. The notion of "defect" can be
discarded without simultaneously abandoning the historical foundation of
tort law, the concept of "fault."
Perhaps the best way to demonstrate this theory is to reexamine fault as
viewed in the classic case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co."7 As
the reader will recall, the case involved a plaintiff who was hit on the head
by a scale while standing on the defendant railroad's platform.'" The scale
was dislodged by a fireworks explosion that resulted when two railroad
employees, attempting to assist a passenger board a train, knocked the
passenger's covered package of fireworks loose in the process. 9 Writing
for a slim four-three majority, Justice Cardozo determined that the defendant
railroad was not negligent."0 The reason that the railroad was not negli-
gent, according to Justice Cardozo, was that the railroad's duty of due care
did not extend to poor Mrs. Palsgraf.2' The gravamen of negligence
according to the majority was that
bodily security is protected, not against all forms of interference or
aggression, but only against some. One who seeks redress at law does not
make out a cause of action by showing without more that there has been
danger to his person. If the harm was not willful, he must show that the
act as to him had possibilities of damage so many and apparent as to
entitle him to be protected against the doing of it though the harm was
unintended.22
The duty to exercise reasonable care, under Justice Cardozo's formula-
tion, is triggered only when one can foresee harm to a particular plaintiff.
Thus, no duty is owed to individuals for whom the defendant cannot
specifically foresee harm. This formulation of negligence gives individuals
16. See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier, supra note 11, at 1267-68.
17. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
18. Id. at 99.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 100.
21. Id. at 100-01.
22. ld. at 101.
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a great deal of freedom to act without legal liability for harms that they may
cause.
The Palsgrafminority's formulation of negligence, expounded by Justice
Andrews, is an entirely different view of fault. According to Justice
Andrews, an individual is negligent 'when he acts in such a manner that
causes harm. Under this view, "[e]very one owes to the world at large the
duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety
of others. 23
The conceptual difference in negligence or fault between the majority
and minority in Palsgraf was not, as Justice Andrews pointed out, "a mere
dispute as to words."24  These two views illustrate the fundamental
difference of opinion as to the purpose of tort law: should tort law seek to
provide compensation for all acts that cause harm, or should tort law seek
to provide compensation only for acts that cause foreseeable harm to the
specific plaintiff? Expressed another way, does one's duty of due care
extend to all mankind or just to the plaintiff at hand?2 How this question
is answered has a tremendous impact on all branches of tort law, including
products liability. If the purpose of tort law is to provide compensation for
innocent victims of faulty acts, we must decide ab initio what we mean by
the term "fault." In the products liability context, how one defines fault
drives one's test for liability.
Modem products liability law clearly embraces Justice Cardozo's notion
of "fault." A manufacturer's conduct is blameworthy only where harm to
the user reasonably can be foreseen. The accepted proxy for fault is the
product defect, which, as has been demonstrated, creates an absurd
asymmetry between manufacturing, design, and informational defects. As
pointed out earlier, manufacturing defects are per se unreasonable because
harm to the user is almost always foreseeable. Design and informational
defects, on the other hand, are not so obviously unreasonable, necessitating
specific proof of unreasonable behavior. The self-defining circularity of this
reasoning is obvious. It essentially presumes that some defects will carry
foreseeable harm (manufacturing defects), while others will not (design and
informational defects). A sliver of glass in a can of beans is presumed to
pose foreseeable harm, while a prescription drug with teratogenic potential
is not.
If one accepts the proposition that a defect is an appropriate surrogate
to identify a faulty product (a proposition causative liability does not
accept), then the focus naturally shifts to the question of how to define the
term "defective." The quest to define the term "defective" has culminated
23. Id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
25. See id. (Andrews, J., dissenting). It should be noted, however, that Justice
Andrews agreed that the concept of proximate cause should be retained in order to cut off
a defendant's liability. See id. at 103; see also infra note 489 and accompanying text.
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in the conceptualization of two distinct categories: (1) products which do not
conform to the reasonable manufacturer's own specifications (manufacturing
defects), and (2) products which conform to specifications, but which no
reasonable manufacturer would place on the market (design and information-
al defects).
Assuming, arguendo, that defect is an indispensable proxy for fault, one
must nonetheless seriously question the validity of the presently accepted
distinctions between manufacturing, design, and informational defects.
These distinctions lose their meaning depending upon the level of abstrac-
tion with which they are viewed. For example, consider the following
example borrowed from the proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts:
XYZ Co. manufactures and sells automobiles. Sam purchased a new XYZ
Model 300 and drove it around town for several days. Unknown to Sam,
the lug nuts that hold the right front wheel to the axle were too large,
allowing them to loosen and present a serious risk of eventual failure.26
Although the Restatement Reporters consider this an illustration of a
manufacturing defect, it could just as reasonably be considered a design
defect. If the lug nuts on the automobile do not conform to the
manufacturer's specifications, current law labels it a manufacturing defect.
By contrast, if the lug nuts are too large because the manufacturer's design
team innocently but mistakenly believed they were an appropriate size,
current law labels it a design defect. In the manufacturing defect situation,
something goes wrong in the factory. The machines or employees malfunc-
tion. In the design defect situation, something goes wrong at the drawing
board. The engineers, chemists, or designers malfunction. But at some
level, every glitch on the factory floor is traceable to a decision made by
those not on the factory floor-the designers, chemists, engineers, and
managers. If a manufacturing defect occurs because quality control
procedures permit an occasional nonconforming product to slip into the
stream of commerce, is not the decision to employ such quality control
procedures undeniably a component of the overall design of the product?
A fortiori, every manufacturing defect is the result of a design defect. In
essence, manufacturing defects are a mere subset of design defects.
Now reconsider the illustration in which Sam is injured when his
automobile's lug nuts come loose. If the use of excessively large lug nuts
is viewed as a mechanical error or a decisional error by a factory worker,
it is a manufacturing defect under current law, and Sam can recover without
specific proof of negligence. If, on the other hand, the use of excessively
large lug nuts is viewed as a decisional error by an engineer or designer, it
is a design defect, and Sam must prove that the overall risks of the
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 5 cmt. b, illus. 1, at
106-07 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994) [hereinafter Tentative Draft].
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product's design outweighed its benefits before he can recover. At this
point, the reader should ponder whether any of this legal line drawing
should matter to Sam. Whether the use of excessively large lug nuts is
viewed on a micro or a macro level, all Sam knows is that his automobile
caused him harm.
Sam's view is essentially the view espoused by Justice Andrews in
Palsgraf. The manufacturer of Sam's automobile is at fault because his
product caused harm. Whether harm to the particular plaintiff (Sam) was
foreseeable should be irrelevant because the failure to use due care on the
factory floor or in the development or implementation of quality control
procedures created a foreseeable risk of harm to someone, somewhere. The
act of placing the automobile in the stream of commerce in such a condition
is an act of fault for which liability should attach.
Such a conception of fault conforms, moreover, to Sam's reasonable
expectations. Sam has no way of knowing whether his automobile's lug
nuts conform to XYZ Co.'s manufacturing specifications or whether XYZ
Co.'s overall design procedures are adequate. To the extent Sam contem-
plates the notion of "defect" at all, he is likely to consider it synonymous
with "injurious": the product injured him; therefore, it is defective.
It is the premise of this Article that if fault is viewed in the manner
espoused by Justice Andrews's dissent in Palsgraf,28 the need for the term
"defect" and all its illogical subdivisions evaporates. Under this view, the
basic foundation of tort law-the fault principle-is retained, but the focus
is shifted to a more appropriate locale--causation. Thus, the key. inquiry is
not whether the product is defective, but whether the product actually and
proximately caused harm. A product that causes harm is per se defective,
and the entity that placed it in the stream of commerce is legally at fault.
Because of the intensive focus on causation, perhaps the best description of
this theory is "causative liability."
Part II of this Article will explore the roots of tort law in an attempt to
discern whether Justice Andrews' conception of fault is historically
supported. Part III will examine the rise of strict liability and its numerous,
often inconsistent, applications. Part IV will provide an in-depth look at the
products liability reforms contained in proposed Restatement (Third) of
Torts. Part V will explore how other countries have approached products
liability in an attempt to gauge how future products liability reform may
affect the global competitiveness of American business. Finally, Part VI
27. 162 N.E. at 101 (Andrews, J., dissenting). It should be noted that Justice
Andrews advocated the use of proximate cause to cut off a defendant's liability when the
potential for harm in the abstract (as opposed to the particular plaintiff) is too attenuated to
fairly attribute legal responsibility to the defendant. See id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting);
see also infra note 489 and accompanying text.
28. Id. at 101-05 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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will discuss the general implications of a causative liability regime and
identify its major strengths and weaknesses.
II. HISTORICAL CONCEPTS OF "FAULT"
A. Trespass
The precursor of modem negligence law is trespass, a legal theory that
emerged in the King's Court in the middle of the thirteenth century.29 In
its initial form, called trespass vi et armis ("by force and arms"),3" liability
was imposed whenever the defendant's use of direct physical force caused
personal or property damage to the plaintiff.3' Intent to bring about harm
was irrelevant-all the plaintiff needed to prove was that a direct physical
act by the defendant resulted in harm.32 General intent to do the act was
"all the fault that was necessary for liability."3  Bacon's 1630 treatise
summarized trespass liability by stating that "if a man be hurt or maimed
only, an action of trespass lieth, though it be done against the party's mind
and will, and he shall be punished in the same as deeply as if he had done
it of malice. ' 34  The defendant's only available defense was a lack of
causation, usually demonstrated by proof that it was not her act that caused
the harm, but rather the superseding act of a third person or an act of
God.35 For example, no causation existed if the defendant could prove that
her act was not volitional because someone grabbed her arm and struck the
plaintiff.
36
Trespass vi et arnis proved to be of limited use, however, to a plaintiff
injured by an indirect act of the defendant. Thus, if X improperly attached
a horseshoe that caused Y's horse to stumble and throw Y, Y could not
recover under a theory of trespass vi et armis because no direct physical
contact occurred between X and y.37 In an effort to plug this compensation
29. WEX S. MALONE, ESSAYS ON TORTS 9 (1986). See also WILLIAM M. LANDES
& RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 2 (1987); Charles 0.
Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359, 362 (1951).
30. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 29, at 2; FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC
W. MAITLAND, 1 THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, lxii (2d
ed. 1968).
31. MALONE, supra note 29, at 9; see also Gregory, supra note 29, at 362.
32. OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 65 (Mark DeWolf Howe ed., 1963);
MALONE, supra note 29, at 9; WILLIAM F. WALSH, A HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW
316 (2d ed. 1932); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 30, at 54; 2 id., at 471, 527-28.
33. Gregory, supra note 29, at 362.
34. WALSH, supra note 32, at 316 (citing BACON, MAXIMS, VII (1630)).
35. HOLMES, supra note 32, at 68.
36. Id.
37. Gregory, supra note 29, at 362; see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 29, at
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gap, the early fourteenth century English courts developed another writ,
trespass sur le cas ("on the case"),3" that permitted plaintiffs to recover
when injury was caused by an indirect act of the defendant.39 As with its
sibling trespass vi et armis, trespass on the case did not require proof of
intent or knowledge of harm.4" The defendant was legally at fault simply
for causing the harm.4'
It is tempting to believe, looking back with twentieth century eyes
accustomed to viewing fault as a concept connoting a lack of reasonable
prudence, that these early English judges viewed fault the same way, but
such was not the case.42 A brief look at a few early decisions concerning
trespass on the case will help to demonstrate the common law concept of
fault for indirect injury.
In the 1466 Case of Thorns, a plaintiff recovered for trespass when his
neighbor, in the process of cutting thorns from a hedge dividing their
property, unintentionally caused some branches to fall and harm the
plaintiffs property.43 Similarly, an English court, hearing a case in 1506
involving an accidental shooting, proclaimed, "[W]hen a man shoots at the
butts and wounds a man, though it is against his will, he shall be called a
trespasser against his intent.""
The 1617 case of Weaver v. Ward5 is often inaccurately cited as
authority for the proposition that early courts employed a negligence
standard for indirect injury. A closer look at the decision, however,
indicates that the court did no such thing. In Weaver, the court held a
soldier responsible for a shooting injury unintentionally inflicted upon a
fellow soldier while participating in a military exercise.' The defendant
in Weaver argued to the King's Bench that he should not be held liable
unless the plaintiff could prove he was at fault.47 The court rejected this
argument, insofar as the term "fault" was meant to be synonymous with
moral culpability.48 The only fault or negligence needed to recover was
38. See generally C.H.S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW:
TORT AND CONTRACT 66-92 (1949).
39. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 29, at 2; MALONE, supra note 29, at 17; Gregory,
supra note 29, at 363.
40. HOLMES, supra note 32, at 65, 68; MALONE, supra note 29, at 18-19.
41. MALONE, supra note 29, at 17.
42. See id. at 11.
43. Y.B. 6 Edw. 4, fol. 7, pl. 18 (1466), reprinted in CHARLES 0. GREGORY ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 48 (3d ed. 1977); see also FIFOOT, supra note 38, at 195-
97.
44. FIFOOT, supra note 38, at 70-71 (citing Y.B. 21 Hen. 7, fol. 27, pl. 5 (1506)).
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acting in a manner that caused injury.49 The court proclaimed that the
defendant could be relieved of liability only upon proof that the act occurred
"utterly without his fault. As if a man by force take my hand and strike
you, or if here the defendant had said, that the plaintiff ran cross his piece
when it was discharging ... and that the defendant had committed no
negligence to give occasion to the hurt.""0  It is apparent from this
statement that while the King's Bench used the language "without his fault"
and "no negligence," these terms were considered to be synonymous with
"no causation." The two examples provided in the court's use of these
terms-a third party grabbing the defendant's hand and the plaintiff deliber-
ately running in front of the defendant's gun-are clearly situations
illustrative of superseding cause. Thus, the early English courts, to the
extent they employed the term "fault," clearly had something other than
moral culpability or a lack of prudence in mind. Fault was a legal term,
used to denote a party's causal responsibility for harm. A defendant was
negligent or at fault in the eyes of the law if he committed an act that was
the actual and proximate cause of harm.
B. Negligence
The concept of fault as synonymous with a lack of prudence first
appeared in the mid-nineteenth century case of Vaughn v. Menlove.5 The
plaintiff was injured when a fire that started in the defendant neighbor's
haystack spread, burning down the plaintiff's house. 2 The Court of
Common Pleas affirmed the jury verdict for the plaintiff on grounds that the
jury could determine whether the defendant failed to "proceed with such
reasonable caution as a prudent man would have exercised under such
circumstances. 5 3 Interestingly, the court noted that the gravamen of the
plaintiff's case was negligence, an action "new in specie, 54 grounded on
the idea that "a man must so use his own property as not to injure that of
others."55
Ironically, while Vaughn v. Menlove approved the use of a jury
instruction that defined legal fault in terms of a lack of reasonable prudence,
it also, in the same breath, proclaimed that this new cause of action was
based upon the age-old maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas-a
concept of fault based upon simple legal causation. 6 In hindsight, this
49. Id.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 492.
54. Id. at 493.
55. Id.
56. "Use your own property so as not to injure that of another." See supra note 12
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incongruity is not particularly shocking. The English courts had developed
a new cause of action, termed "negligence," that was essentially a response
to the Industrial Revolution with its concomitant increase in product-related
workplace injuries. 7 As one commentator aptly noted: "There was wealth
to be had and wages to be earned-but all at high risks in terms of safety.
The new society in its dangerous world was viewed by the courts as one
"158that was willing to compromise safety for economic advantage ....
The definition of fault under common law trespass--synonymous with
causation of harm-was believed to be simply too much for burgeoning
industries to bear. Infant industries stridently argued that a lesser standard
of liability was needed lest courts should discourage investment, research
and development, and full employment.5 9 It just made economic sense, in
a macro view, to limit industry liability to those situations where the
plaintiff could prove some deviation from the behavior of the reasonable
person. The quid pro quo was obvious: Some innocent victims would go
uncompensated so that the money could be invested in expansion of
industry. Thus, with a subtle stroke of the judicial pen, the concept of legal
fault was converted from one of causation of harm to one of failure to
exercise reasonable care.
The Industrial Revolution's revamped conceptualization of legal fault
was quickly embraced by American courts. In Brown v. Kendall,' the
plaintiff was injured when a stick-wielding defendant unintentionally struck
the plaintiff while the defendant was trying to separate two fighting dogs.6
The court denied recovery for plaintiff's trespass allegation, holding that
liability could not be imposed without proof of a lack of reasonable care by
the defendant.62
In the famous 1873 case of Losee v. Buchanan,63 a steam boiler blew
up and cast debris upon the plaintiff's land, causing property damage.'M
In a suit against the operator of the boiler, the court held that the plaintiff
could not recover as he had offered no evidence that the defendant acted
and accompanying text.
57. See Gregory, supra note 29, at 368; MALONE, supra note 29, at 14, 35. But see
Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 15
GA. L. REv. 925, 960-61 (1981) (arguing that negligence was a progressive, pro-plaintiff
reaction to industrial revolution's antecedent no-liability barriers such as privity, immunity,
and privileges).
58. MALONE, supra note 29, at 35.
59. See Gregory, supra note 29, at 368.
60. 60 Mass. 292 (1850).
61. Id. at 293.
62. Id. at 298.
63. 51 N.Y. 476 (1873); see also Losee v. Clute, 51 N.Y. 494 (1873) (suit against
boiler manufacturer).
64. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. at 476.
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unreasonably in operating the boiler.65 Thus, Buchanan made it clear that
this new legal beast known as negligence was very different indeed from
common law trespass. If the Buchanan court had applied common law
trespass on the case principles pronounced in the Case of Thorns" or
Weaver v. Ward,67 Losee clearly would have recovered: the steam boiler
operator would be at fault because he operated a boiler that caused harm to
the innocent plaintiff.
It is clear that by the time of Brown and Buchanan, American courts
had begun the slow drift toward redefining the concept of legal fault through
a new theory dubbed "negligence." Through an almost invisible evolution,
the foundation of tort law-the fault principle-was semantically retained,
but the definition of "legal fault" was fundamentally altered. By judicial
sleight of hand, the meaning of legal fault was magically transformed to
adapt to the changing needs of society.
III. "STRICT" LIABILITY
A. Animals
Perhaps the most ancient and universally accepted form of strict liability
is that for damage caused by trespassing animals. The medieval law of
deodands required the owner of a wandering beast that inflicted harm to
surrender it to the victim's family (or later, the King) as compensation for
breaching the peace and to appease God.6" Thus, the owner of an animal
that caused harm was required to pay compensation without regard to the
exercise of due care.69
Generally speaking, this strict liability has survived to the present day.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes liability on the possessor of
livestock,7" wild animals,7 and domestic animals with known or reason-
ably knowable abnormally dangerous propensities72 even though the
possessor has exercised reasonable care. The Restatement (Second) rules are
not, however, the same as causative liability. Under the proposed causative
liability theory, the owner or possessor of a wild animal, domestic animal,
65. Id.
66. Y.B. 6 Edw. 4, fol. 7, pl. 18 (1466) reprinted in GREGORY, supra note 43, at 48;
see also FIFOOT, supra note 38, at 195-97.
67. 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1617).
68. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 30, at 472-74; 1 id., at 55.
69. See MALONE, supra note 29, at 13; FIFOOT, supra note 38, at 155.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 504 (1977). But see id. § 505 (holding
possessors of livestock that are driven on a public highway liable only for failure to exercise
reasonable care).
71. Id. § 507.
72. Id. § 509.
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or livestock would be required to compensate for any harm actually and
proximately caused by the animal. Thus, the owner of a poodle that
suddenly and inexplicably bites a neighbor's leg would be liable under
causative liability without, regard to whether the owner knew or should have
known of the poodle's dangerous propensities.73
On the other hand, the Restatement (Second) rules regarding wild and
abnormally dangerous domestic animals are stricter than causative liability
because intervening unforeseeable acts of third persons or nature will not
relieve the possessor of liability.74 Interestingly, such intervening acts will
relieve the possessor of livestock from liability under the Restatement
(Second)..75 Under a causative liability approach, acts of nature, other
animals, or third persons would be relevant to determining the legal cause
of harm. If the trier of factydetermined that such intervening acts were
causally responsible, the plaintiff's recovery could be reduced or barred
-altogether.
Another important difference between the Restatement (Second) strict
liability and causative liability concerning wild animals should be noted.
The Restatement (Second) rules limit the possessor's liability to harm that
is caused by a dangerous characteristic of the wild animal.76 Comment e
of section 507 provides an illustration of a tame bear that escapes, falls
asleep in the middle of the highway, and is subsequently run over by the
plaintiff, who is driving with due care. 77 If the plaintiff brings suit alleging
strict liability, she will not recover because falling asleep on a highway is
not a dangerous characteristic of bears.78 The causative liability theory, by
contrast, would permit the injured plaintiff to recover in this situation,
provided that the bear's escape was not so attenuated as to lead the trier of
fact to conclude that the possessor should not be held causally responsible.
Thus, the bear's possessor would have only two defenses under causative
liability: (1) lack of cause-in-fact, and (2) lack of proximate cause. An
intervening event that breaks the chain of causation-such as a third person
who drugs the bear and dumps it in the road-would likely reduce or
eliminate the possessor's liability. Likewise, evidence that the bear escaped
two years before the incident would likely be sufficient to lead the trier of
fact to conclude that harm was too remote to attribute liability to the
possessor. This is so because the passage of time may well result in the
bear's reverting to its wild state, thereby leading the trier of fact to
73. Contra id. § 509 cmt. f ("[T]he possessor of a dog is not liable for its biting a
person or worrying or killing livestock unless he has reason to know that it is likely to do
so.").
74. Id. § 510.
75. Id. § 504(3)(c).
76. Id. § 507(2).
77. Id. § 507 cmt e.
78. Id.
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reasonably conclude that attributing proximate causal responsibility to the
owner would be inequitable.
B. Ultrahazardous/Abnormally Dangerous Activities
Liability without regard to reasonable care has long been imposed upon
actors who engage in ultrahazardous79 or abnormally dangerous"0 activi-
ties. The landmark case generally cited for this proposition is Rylands v.
Fletcher," in which the plaintiffs coal mine was flooded when the
defendant's reservoir burst through an undiscovered subterranean shaft. 2
Although the defendant was found to have exercised all reasonable care, the
House of Lords held that the defendant was liable for the harm resulting
from the non-natural use of his land.
8 3
The rule pronounced in Rylands amounts to causative liability for certain
unusual uses of land, such as the storage of large quantities of water. The
actor who engages in such use of his land does so at his peril and may
escape liability for harm only upon a showing of intervening, or lack of,
causation. 4 While the specific holding of Rylands was limited to unspeci-
fied non-natural uses of land, its underlying rationale potentially has much
broader application.
One major theme in the Rylands decision is the notion of risk reciproci-
ty. Judge Blackmun's opinion from the Exchequer Chamber noted,
[T]here is no ground for saying that the plaintiff here took upon himself
any risk arising from the uses to which the defendants should choose to
apply their land. He neither knew what these might be, nor could he in
any way control the defendants, or hinder their building what reservoirs
they liked, and storing up in them what they pleased .... ."
If, as in Rylands, one party imposes upon another a risk against which
the other cannot protect himself, he has invaded the other's protected interest
in property or bodily integrity. If risks are not reciprocal, one party has the
ability to limit another's freedom to use his body or property. As between
the two parties, it seems reasonable to conclude that the party who acts in
a manner that limits the other's freedom should bear the consequences of
such action. Thus, because the defendant in Rylands imposed a risk upon
the plaintiff that the plaintiff was ill-equipped to discover or guard against,
79. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 519-524 (1938).
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-524A (1977).
81. 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
82. Id. at 332.
83. Id. at 342.
84. Id. at 339-40 (quoting the opinion of the lower court, the Exchequer Chamber,
L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866)).
85. 1 Ex. 265, 287 (1866), aftd, L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
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no reciprocity of risk justified employing a less stringent liability stan-
dard.
8 6
Another policy rationale implied in Rylands is the notion of negligence
per se. In other words, there seems to be an implicit recognition that storing
large quantities of water, no matter how carefully done, is inherently
unreasonable because the risks and resulting injury are so great. Thus,
although the plaintiff cannot prove negligence on the part of the defendant,
the activity itself bespeaks negligence, much in the same way that a
manufacturing 'defect, such as a rat in a bottle, bespeaks negligence."
There is "negligence in the air," and while the plaintiff would likely be
unable to prove it, the activity undoubtedly caused harm; therefore, in
retrospect engaging in an activity that hurts someone smacks of fault.
If this view is accepted, the notion of legal fault in the Rylands case
begins to resemble Justice Andrews's notion of fault in Palsgraf88 In both
the Rylands decision and the view of Justice Andrews, the defendant's act
is legally faulty because the defendant imposed nonreciprocal risk upon the
plaintiff. As between the Long Island Railroad Company and Mrs. Palsgraf,
Justice Andrews believed that the railroad should bear legal responsibility
because it created a risk Mrs. Palsgraf was powerless to guard against. As
between the mine operator and the reservoir owner in Rylands, the reservoir
owner was held legally responsible because it imposed upon the mine
operator a risk that the mine operator was unable to prevent by reasonable
precautions.
As between the innocent plaintiff and the defendant who voluntarily
chooses to engage in such activity, fundamental notions of fairness support
the Rylands outcome. Imposing the costs of harm upon the enterprise that
engages in the activity forces the activity to internalize the costs of harm,
enabling consumers to make more intelligent and socially efficient
purchasing decisions and providing the enterprise with a strong incentive to
avoid harm.89 If reservoirs such as the one in Rylands are forced to absorb
the costs of accidental spillage, presumably the cost of water stored in such
a manner will more accurately reflect its true societal costs, providing
incentives to consumers and water storage enterprises to substitute safer
alternatives. 9°  If safer alternatives are not available, internalization
86. See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv.
537, 547 (1972) (noting that strict liability is normally imposed when there is no reciprocity
of risk between the plaintiff and defendant).
87. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
89. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 29, at 294; 1 REPORTERS' STUDY:
ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 398 (A.L.I. 1991) [hereinafter 1
ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY]; Jane Stapleton, Products Liability Reform-Real or Illusory?,
6 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 392, 396 (1986).
90. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 181-82 (4th ed. 1992).
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nonetheless achieves economic efficiency by encouraging greater investment
in safety and providing less cumbersome means of adjudicating legal
responsibility."
Despite the many sound policies underlying the Rylands doctrine, it was
met with a cold reception in the United States. It was viewed by American
courts as a "weed in an unwelcoming garden" that held the potential of
smothering infant industries with liability.93 The opinion of the New York
Court of Appeals in Losee v. Buchanan94 is indicative of this judicial
paternalism: "We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals and
railroads. They are demanded by the manifold wants of mankind, and lay
at the basis of all our civilization." 95
In the face of such resistance, the first Restatement of Torts drafted a
carefully circumscribed Rylands-esque rule for what it termed "ultrahazard-
ous" activities. 96 An ultrahazardous activity was tightly defined as one that
"necessarily involves a risk of serious harm... which cannot be eliminated
by the exercise of utmost care, and ... is not a matter of common
usage." 97 Furthermore, unlike Rylands, the original Restatement imposed
liability even though the harm was caused by an unforeseeable act of nature
or a third person. 9
What sort of activities were deemed ultrahazardous? It is apparent that
the product manufacturer did not meet the definition of the original
Restatement because the manufacture of products is a matter of common
usage,99 and the risk of serious harm is quite small." ° Thus, as it was
defined, the ultrahazardous activity doctrine held little promise for victims
of product injuries. Arguably, however, some products would fail the
risk/utility test used in the Restatement of Torts.'" For example, certain
prescription drugs may well present risks that outweigh benefits for some
individuals. Even though a prescription drug may have great utility for most
users such that it is not unreasonable or negligent for the manufacturer to
91. HOLMES, supra note 32, at 93; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 29, at 294;
Stapleton, supra note 89, at 395-96.
92. Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization of Hazardous Activity
Strict Liability, 65 N.C. L. REv. 257, 258 (1987); see also Gregory, supra note 29, at 377.
93. Nolan & Ursin, supra note 92, at 260-65; see also Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H.
442, 448 (1873); Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 486-87 (1873).
94. 51 N.Y. 476 (1873).
95. Id. at 484.
96. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 519-524 (1938).
97. Id. § 520.
98. Id. § 522.
99. See id. § 520 cmt. e (defining common usage as that which "is customarily
carried on by the great mass of mankind or by many people in the community").





market it, 2 the drug manufacturer has imposed a risk upon users that they
are incapable of predicting or protecting themselves against.'0 3
The resulting inconsistency should be apparent. If Smith is injured by
falling debris as he passes by a blasting operation, he will be able to recover
under the ultrahazardous activity doctrine.' If, however, Smith is injured
by a prescription drug, the doctrine does not apply, and Smith will be forced
to prove negligence on the part of the drug manufacturer.0 5 In both
instances Smith arguably was aware that he faced some degree of risk by
walking alongside a blasting operation or by ingesting a prescription drug.
However, in both instances Smith is unable to predict the likelihood of harm
or protect himself against it. Thus, it can be said that the blaster and the
prescription drug manufacturer have each imposed a nonmutual risk upon
Smith for which they should be liable. If Smith exercises his freedom by
walking past a blasting operation or swallowing a prescription drug and is
harmed thereby, the blaster or the drug manufacturer should bear responsi-
bility when harm results. As between Smith and the blaster or drug
manufacturer, the blaster or drug manufacturer should be deemed legally at
fault because his action caused harm.
Given that one of the underlying rationales of the ultrahazardous
activities doctrine is this notion of risk reciprocity, why does the doctrine
not extend to the hypothetical drug manufacturer? The answer appears to
be the language of the original Restatement requiring that the activity not be
a matter of "common usage."'" Comment e to section 520 defines this
term as an activity "customarily carried on by the great mass of mankind or
by many people in the community."' '  Because prescription drugs are
undoubtedly consumed by the great mass of mankind, Smith is out of luck.
Ironically, the ultrahazardous activity doctrine does not apply when it
is needed the most-when an activity presents non-reciprocal risks to many
people. The implicit message is that a socially useful activity that is widely
engaged in will not be deemed ultrahazardous. The more successfully an
enterprise lures individuals to engage in the activity, the more likely that it
will be protected from the ultrahazardous doctrine, creating perverse
incentives to garner market share rather than to develop safer alternatives.
102. Id.
103. See id. § 520 cmt. d (Ultrahazardous activity "is of a sort which must be carried
on under conditions which cannot be predicted at the time it is entered upon and which, if
they arise, are incapable of being so provided against as to make the activity safe.").
104. See id. § 520 cmt. c (identifying blasting as an ultrahazardous activity).
105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965) (declaring
prescription drugs unavoidably unsafe, and therefore no strict liability can lie).
106. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520(b) (1938).
107. Id. § 520 cmt. e. A question exists as to whether the language "carried on" refers
to consumption or production. For an interesting case interpreting this language to refer to
the number of producers, see Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218, 223 (Wash. 1977)
(crop dusting not a matter of common usage because only carried on by a few enterprises).
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The Restatement (Second) reformulation of the doctrine-renamed the
abnormally dangerous activity doctrine"'--obscured matters even more.
Section 520 of the Restatement (Second) adopted an explicit balancing
approach to determine whether an activity was abnormally dangerous, listing
six factors for consideration:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on;
and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes."°
Comment f to section 520 makes it clear that no one factor is decisive
and that all factors do not have to be present, although "ordinarily several
of them will be required. . . ."1 10 As was the case with the ultrahazardous
activity doctrine,"1 the determination of whether an activity is abnormally
dangerous under these criteria is a matter of law for the court."'
The adoption of a balancing approach converted the liability standard for
abnormally dangerous activities from causative liability to negligence.'
3
It is merely an elaborate version of Learned Hand's negligence formula, B
< PL." '4 The only difference is that under the abnormally dangerous
activity doctrine, the determination of negligence is made by the judge
rather than the jury, which according to Professors Henderson and Twerski
has the desirable effect of reducing the "risk of succumbing to jury lawless-
ness."' 5 Interestingly, the comments to section 519 vehemently deny this
negligence characterization, proclaiming that
108. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-524A (1977).
109. Id. § 520.
110. Id. § 520cmt. f.
111. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 cmt. h (1938).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. 1 (1977).
113. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 78, at 555 (5th ed. 1984); Nolan & Ursin, supra note 92, at 273; accord Yukon
Equip., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Alaska 1978) (The
"Restatement (Second) approach requires an analysis of degrees of risk and harm, difficulty
of eliminating risk, and appropriateness of place, before absolute liability may be imposed.
Such factors suggest a negligence standard.").
114. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (if
burden of precautions is less than the probability times the magnitude of loss, then negligence
exists).
115. Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier, supra note 11, at 1319-20.
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[t]he liability stated in this Section is not... based upon any negligence,
either in attempting to carry on the activity itself in the first instance, or
in the manner in which it is carried on. The defendant is held liable
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm to the
plaintiff that has ensued. The liability arises out of the abnormal danger
of the activity itself, and the risk that it creates, of harm to those in the
vicinity. It is founded upon a policy of the law that imposes upon anyone
who for his own purposes creates an abnormal risk of harm to his
neighbors, the responsibility of relieving against that harm when it does in
fact occur. The defendant's enterprise, in other words, is required to pay
its way by compensating for the harm it causes, because of its special,
abnormal and dangerous character."1
6
While the comment spews forth a plethora of causative liability
buzzwords, it is all smoke and mirrors. Causative liability based upon
abnormal danger is an oxymoron. Use of the abnormal qualification
inherently requires a balancing of the risks and benefits of the activity to
determine whether a reasonable person would have engaged in the activity.
The liability producing condition, abnormal danger, is negligence. Under
causative liability, by contrast, the liability producing condition is causally-
linked harm.
Again, the consequences of the semantical manipulation of the strict
liability is misleading. Comment h to section 520 claims that the abnormal-
ly dangerous activity doctrine is aimed at forcing an enterprise to internalize
the costs of harm associated with the "unavoidable risk remaining in the
activity, even though the actor has taken all reasonable precautions
.... 11,7 Thus, because the activity cannot be made safe by the exercise
of reasonable care, it is abnormally dangerous and strict liability, based on
a balancing of factors, should be applied."'
If one takes the pronouncements of strict liability seriously, a glaring
inconsistency develops. The reason articulated for imposing strict liability
in the abnormally dangerous activities context is that the danger is un-
avoidable. Yet in the products liability context, unavoidable danger is cited
as the reason for not imposing strict liability." 9  Thus, comment k of
section 402A proclaims:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge,
are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.
These are especially common in the field of drugs .... Such a product,
properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is
not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous .... The seller of such
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 cmt. d (1977).
117. Id. § 520 cmt. h (emphasis added).
118. Id. § 520 cmt. h.
119. Id. § 402A cmt. k (1965).
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products ... is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate conse-
quences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply
the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with
a known but apparently reasonable risk.'20
The only plausible way to reconcile the inconsistency between the
Restatement (Second) products liability rules and the abnormally dangerous
activity doctrine is to point out that the latter is inapplicable if the activity
is a matter of common usage. But as discussed earlier, 2 ' this distinction
creates perverse incentives and appears to have no logical foundation. The
fewer the people who engage in an activity, the more likely the activity will
be deemed abnormally dangerous. One must question whether this is a
sound proposition: Is the use or participation of a large number of people
an equitable or logical basis upon which to declare that an activity is not
abnormally dangerous? What if, as in the case of products such as
prescription drugs, the common usage is arguably brought about by
necessity?
These are important questions because the common usage factor so
dominates the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine that it is the deciding
factor in many cases. The dominance of the common usage factor becomes
clear when one closely examines the list of six factors contained in section
520. Of the six factors, three incorporate the notion of common usage,
including subsection (d), "extent to which the activity is not a matter of
common usage,"' 2 2 subsection (e), "inappropriateness of the activity to the
place where it is carried on,"'123 and subsection (f), "extent to which its
value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes."'
' 24
These three factors seem redundant because an activity of common usage
generally will be considered appropriate to the place where it is carried on
and likely will have great value to the community.
Thus, the balance of section 520 is from the outset skewed toward a
finding of no abnormal danger if the matter is of common usage because
"ordinarily several of [the factors] will be required for strict liability. ' 25
Thus, the presence or absence of this "Popularity Trilogy" can have a
significant impact on outcome. A plaintiff injured by blasting conducted in
a town where the largest employer manufacturers and stores explosives is
not likely to recover under the Restatement (Second). On the other hand,
a plaintiff injured by blasting that occurs in an isolated area is likely to
recover.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(d) (1977).
123. Id. § 520(e).
124. Id. § 520(0.
125. Id. § 520 cmt. f.
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The skewed balance of the Restatement (Second) and its corresponding
potential for unfairness has led several courts either explicitly to reject it or
to pay perfunctory lip service to the doctrine while manipulating the factors
to achieve justice. For example, the Washington Supreme Court, in Siegler
v. Kuhlman,26 held that judgment as a matter of law was appropriate for
the family of a deceased seventeen-year-old girl who was killed when her
car became engulfed in flames after driving over a gasoline spill emanating
from defendant's tractor trailer. 127 The jury determined that neither the
tractor trailer owner nor the driver had been negligent in the operation or
maintenance of the tractor trailer;121 therefore, the plaintiffs' only viable
theories of recovery were res ipsa loquitur'29 and the abnormally danger-
ous activity doctrine. After extensively analogizing the case to Rylands v.
Fletcher,3 ° the court paid lip service to the six factors of section 520,'
determining that three out of the six factors were present: high degree of
risk; likelihood of great harm; and inability to eliminate danger through the
exercise of reasonable care.' The remaining three factors of the Restate-
ment (Second) were not mentioned. Not surprisingly, the three factors not
mentioned are the Popularity Trilogy. 33 Two reasons were proffered for
classifying the transportation of gasoline (clearly a matter of common usage)
as abnormally dangerous: (1) lack of risk reciprocity, and (2) the difficulty
of proving negligence in cases where the evidence is destroyed. 34 Both
rationales are, of course, consistent with the Rylands13' decision. Thus,
the Siegler decision is arguably an adoption of Rylands'36 rather than an
application of the abnormally dangerous activities doctrine of the Restate-
ment (Second).
Five years after Siegler, the Washington Supreme Court again appeared
to perfunctorily apply the Restatement (Second) factors, in Langan v.
Valicopters, Inc.13 1 In Langan, an organic farmer suffered extensive crop
damage when his neighbors crop-dusted for beetle infestation. 3  Analyz-
ing the case under sections 519 and 520,139 the court surprisingly found
126. 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972) (en bane), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973).
127. Id. at 1183-84.
128. Id. at 1183.
129. The Washington Supreme Court also held that the trial court erred in refusing to
instruct the jury as to res ipsa loquitur. Id. at 1184.
130. 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
132. Siegler, 502 P.2d at 1186-87.
133. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 520(d)-(f) (1977).
134. Siegler, 502 P.2d at 1185.
135. Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
136. Id.
137. 567 P.2d 218 (Wash. 1977).
138. Id. at 219.
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-520 (1977).
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all six factors present."' Its analysis of the Popularity Trilogy is particu-
larly adroit. The court confessed that crop dusting in the Yakima Valley
was not uncommon, but concluded that it was not a matter of common
usage because "it is carried on by only a comparatively small number of
persons .... ,,14 The court manipulated the Restatement (Second)
statement that an activity is a matter of common usage if "carried on by the
great mass of mankind or by many people in the community," ' 2 by
focusing on the small number of aircraft employed in the crop-dusting
business, rather than the comparatively great number of farmers who
employed the crop dusters. 
4
Regarding appropriateness of crop dusting to the Yakima Valley, the court
simply stated: "Given the nature of organic farming, the use of pesticides
adjacent to such an area must be considered an activity conducted in an
inappropriate place."'" In making this statement, the court simply erred.
Given that most farmers in the Yakima Valley, as elsewhere, are nonorganic
farmers who necessarily utilize pesticides, it is more logical to assume that
the organic farm was inappropriately located, not the farm using pesticides.
Indeed, the Restatement (Second) comment seems to make this point clear,
There are some highly dangerous activities, that necessarily involve a risk
of serious harm in spite of all possible care, that can be carried on only in
a particular place. Coal mining must be done where there is coal; oil wells
can be located only where there is oil; and a dam impounding water in a
stream can be situated only in the bed of a stream. If these activities are
of sufficient value to the community ... they may not be regarded as
abnormally dangerous when they are so located, since the only place where
the activity can be carried on must necessarily be regarded as an appropri-
ate one.1
45
Likewise, crop dusting must be done where there are nonorganic crops.
Thus, engaging in crop dusting in an area essentially dedicated to nonorgan-
ic crops can hardly be said to be inappropriate to the place.
With regard to the final prong of the Popularity Trilogy, value to the
community, the Langan court conceded that crop dusting was valuable to
the community.'46 Nonetheless, the court felt that the dangerous attributes
of crop dusting were sufficient to outweigh this value and concluded that
140. Langan, 567 P.2d at 222-23.
141. Id. at 223.
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 520 cmt. i (1977).
143. The court stated that less than 300 aircraft were used for crop dusting during the
year in which the injury occurred. Langan, 567 P.2d at 223.
144. Id.
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. j (1977).
146. Langan, 567 P.2d at 223.
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crop dusters should pay their own way.'47 Whether the value of crop
dusting to the Yakima Valley is outweighed by the danger is, of course, a
question upon which reasonable minds can differ. But certainly the Langan
court's cursory dismissal of the value to the community factor is suspect.
It evidences a desire of the court to achieve what it perceived as a just result
(compensation for the organic farmer) by manipulating the biased Restate-
ment (Second) factors.
The Washington Supreme Court has not been alone in its apparent
distaste for the Restatement (Second) factor approach. In Yukon Equipment,
Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.,48 the Alaska Supreme Court
explicitly rejected the Restatement (Second) balancing test as applied to the
storage of explosives on the grounds that the test "suggest[s] a negligence
standard."'49 Noting that the imposition of strict liability for the storage
and use of explosives had been "resolved by more than a century of judicial
decisions,"'5° the Yukon court went on to condemn the Popularity Trilogy:
We see no reason for making a distinction between the right of a
homesteader'to recover when his property has been damaged by a blast set
off in a remote comer of the state, and the right to compensation of an
urban resident whose home is destroyed by an explosion originating in a
settled area. In each case, the loss is properly to be regarded as a cost of
the business of storing or using explosives.'
The Yukon court's rebuff of the Restatement (Second) was imitated by
the Oregon Supreme Court in Koos v. Roth. 2 In Koos, the court imposed
strict liability on a farmer who engaged in the common practice of field
burning to clear out old crops.' In so doing, the court explicitly rejected
two prongs of the Popularity Trilogy, appropriateness to place and value to
the community.'54 Thus, although field burning was concededly a matter
of common usage in the community, the court refused to give weight to the
value to the community or appropriateness to place in determining whether
it was abnormally dangerous,' stating that
the question is who shall pay for harm that has been done.... To say that
when the activity has great economic value the cost should be borne by
147. Id.
148. 585 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1978).
149. Id. at 1211.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 652 P.2d 1255 (Or. 1982).
153. Id. at 1267-68.
154. Id. at 1262-63.
155. Id.
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others is no more or less logical than to say that when the costs of an
activity are borne by others it gains in value.
156
The rationale for imposing strict liability exposed in Siegler,'
Langan,158 Yukon, 59 and Koos 60 has an eerie resemblance to the rea-
soning of Rylands v. Fletcher16' and the early English cases involving
common law trespass.162  Enterprises that engage in crop dusting, the
transportation of hazardous substances, explosives storage, or field burning
are held legally responsible for harm caused by the enterprise. 63 Because
the defendant has chosen to inject a nonreciprocal risk into the community
and because the risk resulted in harm, the defendant should be held legally
responsible. Thus, even though he can prove that he acted as a prudent
gasoline transporter, blaster, crop duster, or field burner, he is nevertheless
legally at fault because his actions caused harm. This proposition is the
essence of causative liability.
The presence of the Popularity Trilogy in the Restatement (Second)
effectively precludes the imposition of causative liability for many hazardous
enterprises. Courts that choose to faithfully apply the Restatement (Second)
factors seem to acknowledge this result. For example, in Indiana Harbor
Belt Railroad Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 6 the Seventh Circuit
reversed a summary judgment for the plaintiff switching line operator who
was injured when the defendant's leased railroad car leaked the hazardous
chemical acrylonitrile.'65 In holding that the action was not abnormally
dangerous, Judge Posner, writing for the majority, invoked the Popularity
Trilogy on behalf of the defendant, noting that transportation of hazardous
substances via rail was a matter of common usage and that "there is no
compelling reason to move to a regime of strict liability, especially one that
156. Id. at 1262.
157. Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 983 (1973).
158. Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218 (Wash. 1977).
159. Yukon Equip., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1978).
160. Koos, 652 P.2d 1255.
161. 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
162. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
163. The Yukon court seems to adopt an absolute liability standard, which is more
stringent than causative liability. In Yukon, the explosion was caused by the deliberate
ignition of thieves who had broken into the magazine. 585 P.2d at 1207. Under a causative
liability standard the thieves' act could constitute a superseding cause to reduce or relieve
the defendant of liability. Contra RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522 (1977) (acts of
third persons, animals, or nature will not relieve the defendant of liability for carrying on an
abnormally dangerous activity).
164. 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990).
165. Id. at 1175.
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might embrace all other hazardous materials shipped by rail as well." '16
In addition, shipping hazardous substances via rail was not inappropriate to
the place because railroad cars must inevitably traverse populated areas such
as Chicago.167 In Judge Posner's view, "Brutal though it may seem to say
it, the inappropriate use to which land is being put in the Blue Island [rail]
yard and neighborhood may be, not the transportation of hazardous chemi-
cals, but residential living."
1 68
In a single sentence, Judge Posner turns the notion of risk reciprocity on
its head. Although the hazardous substance shipper is undeniably the actor
who injects the risk into the community, Judge Posner seems to conclude
that it is the community residents who must bear responsibility when harm
results. It is the residents who are at fault for living there. Brutal, indeed.
But arguably a faithful application of the Restatement (Second) and the
Popularity Trilogy.
Of the three prongs of the Popularity Trilogy, the value to the communi-
ty factor 69 is perhaps the most disturbing. It essentially requires the court
to conduct a balancing test within a balancing test. First, the court must
balance value of the activity against its risks. 7 Next, the court must take
the product of the first balance and pour it into the overarching balance with
the other five factors. The danger in such a two-tiered balancing act is that
a court which determines an activity's community value outweighs its risks
will likely never conduct the second tier balance at all, rendering the other
five factors listed in section 520 superfluous. This concern was expressed
by several members of the A.L.I. during the debate on the adoption of
section 520, including Professor Keeton, who believed that inclusion of the
value to the community factor would "almost wipe out strict liability for a
socially desirable enterprise."'' One participant believed such value
judgments should not be a factor because they were inappropriate subject
matter for the courts, belonging more appropriately to the legislative
branch."72
This last argument is particularly fascinating because it highlights yet
another glaring inconsistency between the abnormally, dangerous activities
doctrine and products liability. The very value judgments explicitly required
by section 520(0 for abnormally dangerous activities are condemned by
some as beyond the purview of judges and juries in products liability design
defect cases.' Such value judgments are termed "polycentric" in the
166. Id. at 1179.
167. Id. at 1180.
168. Id. at 1181.
169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(0 (1977).
170. Id.
171. 41 A.L.I. PROC. 462 (1964); accord Nolan & Ursin, supra note 92, at 272-73.
172. 41 A.L.I. PROC. 460 (1964) (remarks of A.L.I. Vice President John Buchanan).
173. See REPORTERS' STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY, 2
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products liability design defect context, meaning they are simply too
complex for appropriate resolution by judges and juries.7 4 Why are such
value judgments not also polycentric when used in the abnormally dangerous
activities context?
There appears to be no logical reason for the distinction. Indeed, the
only difference in the two situations is that in the abnormally dangerous
activity context it is the judge who makes the value judgment whereas in
design defect litigation these value judgments are often made by the jury.
But surely this distinction cannot justify condemning value judgments in
design defect cases. First, if one believes that value judgments are
inappropriate in design cases because juries are normally the decisionmaker,
then this belief reflects a fundamental distrust of juries, not a belief that
value judgments regarding design defects are incapable of resolution. The
solution, therefore, would lie in abolishing the jury system or restricting the
jury's role in such judgments, not in denying altogether the validity of value
judgments in design defect cases. Second, if one truly believes that juries
are incapable of making value judgments, then one must also deny juries the
responsibility for deciding negligence cases. After all, the classic formula
for negligence, B < PL, 75 requires a careful balancing of benefits against
probability of harm and risk of loss.
In the end, whether an act is negligent or not is undoubtedly a highly
polycentric value judgment generally made by the jury. Holmes recognized
the polycentricity of negligence long ago when he stated, "The trouble with
many cases of negligence is ... that the elements are so complex that courts
are glad to leave the whole matter in a lump for the jury's determina-
tion."'76 If a judge is considered capable of determining whether value of
blasting to a community is outweighed by the risks involved in blasting,
why is a jury incapable of determining 'vhether the value of a prescription
drug to the community is outweighed by its inherent risks? And if a jury
is capable of weighing the benefits, risks, and probabilities of harm
regarding a physician's decisions (as in a malpractice suit), why is it
incapable of weighing such factors for a prescription drug? The answer, of
course, is that in all of these scenarios, the judge or jury is perfectly able to
make such value judgments. The debate, therefore, is not whether such
judgments should be made but rather who should make them.
The abnormally dangerous activity doctrine has had a checkered past,
and many commentators have all but pronounced it dead, a victim of
A.L.I. 55-57 (1991); Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier, supra note 11, at 1305.
But see Stapleton, supra note 89, at 408.
174. See Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier, supra note 11, at 1305.
175. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand,
J.).
176. HOLMES, supra note 32, at 103; accord Stapleton, supra note 89, at 408.
1994] 1305
TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW
judicial resistance and skepticism.'7 In most courts its application has
been carefully circumscribed to activities such as blasting,' crop dust-
ing, 179 explosives storage, 8° oil drilling, 8' and the handling of toxic
substances. 2 Oddly, the safer an activity, the more likely negligence will
be the standard of liability. 3  Is this a logical result? An activity or
product that appears safe to the plaintiff arguably brings with it an implied
warranty of safety which, if breached, should result in legal responsibility
for the enterprise that placed it in the stream of commerce." Indeed, it
is precisely because the activity or product appears harmless that causative
liability is a more appropriate legal standard. An innocuous-looking activity
or product imposes risks which plaintiffs are particularly unable to anticipate
or guard against. In such situations, there is clearly no reciprocity of risk
between the parties; therefore, as between the defendant imposing the risk
and the unassuming plaintiff, equity demands that liability be borne by the
defendant.
If an activity is abnormally dangerous and causes harm, the injured
plaintiff recovers. As Dean Prosser stated during debates on the adoption
of the doctrine, nothing has to "go wrong" with the activity before liability
is imposed. 5 Thus, once the activity has been pigeonholed as abnormally
dangerous, no defect need be shown. The plaintiff does not have to prove
that the blaster failed to conform to his own blasting procedures or that a
reasonable blaster would not have blasted in such a manner. It is sufficient
to show that the blaster hurt the plaintiff.
By contrast, in the products liability field, the plaintiff is saddled with
the burden of proving that the product was in a "defective condition
177. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A
Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697, 700 n.17 (1978) (characterizing the doctrine as "of almost
no practical importance."); Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of
Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REv. 963, 976 (1981) (commenting that the doctrine appears
stagnated).
178. See, e.g., Spano v. Perini Corp., 250 N.E.2d 31 (N.Y. 1969).
179. See, e.g., Gotreaux v. Gary, 94 So. 2d 293 (La. 1957); Langan v. Valicopters,
Inc., 567 P.2d 218 (Wash. 1977). But see Lawler v. Skelton, 130 So. 2d 565 (Miss. 1961).
180. See, e.g., Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1931).
181. See, e.g., Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 270 P. 952 (Cal. 1928).
182. See, e.g., State Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron, 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983)
(toxic waste). See generally Nolan & Ursin, supra note 92.
183. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(a)-(b) (1977) (degree and
likelihood of risk are two of six factors in determining whether activity is abnormally
dangerous); see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 29, at 114 (noting that as blasting
becomes safer the reasons for imposing negligence liability standard increase).
184. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
185. 41 A.L.I. PROC. 451 (1964).
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unreasonably dangerous .... ,,"86 Thus, beyond proving abnormal or
unreasonable danger, the products plaintiff must also prove that the widget
failed to conform to the manufacturer's own specifications or that no
reasonable manufacturer would have placed the widget in the stream of
commerce. Why must the products plaintiff bear this heavier burden? The
distinction seems insupportable. A plaintiff injured by a widget has been
harmed just as truly as a plaintiff injured by blasting. In either situation, the
risk is nonreciprocal. In either situation, the defendant has caused the harm.
In either situation, therefore, the defendant should be held legally responsi-
ble.
C. Warranty Law
One large area of strict liability law often overlooked is that of warranty.
Warranties may be either express"' or implied."'
1. Express Warranty
Since the landmark 1932 case of Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 1 plain-
tiffs injured as a result of reliance on an express warranty can recover
without proof of privity or any failure of the manufacturer to exercise
reasonable care. 9° Liability for breach of an express warranty is analo-
gous to causative liability in that the only defense available is a lack of
causation, which customarily manifests itself as a lack of reliance in the
seller's expressions.' 9' No proof of defect need be shown. If the product
does not comply with the seller's express representations and if those
representations were a factor in the purchasing or use decision, the seller is
liable for any harm caused by a failure of the product to comport with the
representation.
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965).
187. See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965).
188. See U.C.C. § 2-314-315; see also Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d
436, 442 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
189. 12 P.2d 409 (Wash. 1932).
190. Id. at 412; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B(b) (1965) (privity
not required for express warranty in tort action).
191. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965) (Harm must be "caused
by justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation .... .'); U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3 ("In actual
practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during a bargain are regarded
as part of the description of those goods; hence no particular reliance on such statements
need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement."). But see Stang v.
Hertz Corp., 490 P.2d 475 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that express warranty made after
customer signs a car rental agreement cannot be "basis of the bargain" required for recovery
under U.C.C. § 2-213(l)(a)), rev'd on other grounds, 497 P.2d 732 (N.M. 1972).
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For example, in Klages v. General Ordnance Equipment Corp.'92 the
plaintiff, a motel night clerk, was shot in the head by a robber after
unsuccessfully attempting to incapacitate the robber by squirting mace into
his eyes.193 The advertisements for the mace boasted that it would provide
"instantaneous incapacitation ... an attacker is subdued-instantly
.... 1'94 Despite the fact that the plaintiff hit the robber with mace "'right
beside the nose,"" 95  the mace failed to subdue the robber as
promised. 6 The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a judgment for
the plaintiff on his express warranty in tort'97 claim on grounds that the
plaintiff had justifiably relied on promotional representations to which the
product failed to comply.'98 Thus, even in the face of possible supersed-
ing or intervening cause such as the criminal act in Klages, express warranty
liability is broadly imposed if reasonable reliance and nonconformance to
the seller's express advertisements can be proven. In this respect, express
warranty may be more absolute than causative liability because liberal
construction of the reliance element'" implicitly relaxes proximate
causation requirements.
2. Implied Warranty
From an academic standpoint, implied warranty strict liability is more
intriguing than its express warranty sibling. The Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) recognizes two implied warranties: the implied warranty of
merchantability2° and the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose.20' The implied warranty of merchantability originated as a tort
action for trespass on the case and is analogous to its sister tort of
deceit.2 2 The implied warranty of merchantability spans a wide concep-
tual range, with seven possible definitions provided in the U.C.C. for
merchantable goods,2"3 including such things as "fair average quality,"20
192. 367 A.2d 304 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976).
193. Id. at 307.
194. Id. at 306.
195. Id. at 307.
196. Id.
197. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965).
198. Klages, 367 A.2d at 312-13.
199. See U.C.C. § 1-102 (1990) (Act to be liberally construed to promote "underlying
purposes and policies"). See also Lane v. C.A. Swanson & Sons, 278 P.2d 723, 726 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1955) (noting that the current trend is to construe literally language regarding the
quality of the goods in favor of the buyer).
200. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1990).
201. Id. § 2-315.
202. See William L. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN.
L. REv. 117 (1943).
203. See U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a)-(f) (1990).
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"fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used,"2 ° and
"adequately contained, packaged, and labeled."2" The most commonly
used definition in products liability cases is "fit for the ordinary purposes for
which such goods are used."20 7 If the plaintiff can establish (1) that the
product is not merchantable, (2) that the plaintiff suffered harm, and (3) that
the harm was caused by the product, she will recover.
A defendant's exercise of due care will be relevant to determining
whether the warranty of merchantability was breached.2 8 Therefore, the
implied warranty of merchantability seems to be a hybrid of negligence and
strict liability much like section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Indeed, both section 402A and U.C.C's implied warranty of merchantability
appear to require specific proof of deviation or malfunction, the former
requiring the product be in a "defective condition '" 2° and the latter
requiring the product be of "unmerchantable" quality.210 Perhaps the chief
advantage to an injured plaintiff of the implied warranty of merchantability
action over a section 402A action is simply that the term "merchantable" is
broad enough to encompass a greater array of product malfunctions than
section 402A. Of course, these advantages may be offset by the requirement
of notice,21 the possibility of disclaimer,212 and other restrictions of
warranty law.
While the fundamental roots of implied warranties lie in tort,2t 3 their
modem development and significance decidedly lie in contract. The result
is that the usefulness of implied warranties has been curtailed due to
numerous procedural hurdles inherent in contract law. Relegating the notion
of implied warranties to contract law has drained it of its force and heritage.
Indeed, it is ironic that the only recognized tort action for warranty, section
402B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, is limited to express warranties,
a cause of action springing from contract law, not tort law. Why has tort
law embraced the contract offspring of express warranty but shunned its
own offspring of implied warranty? Arguably, tort law should recognize,
as Justice Traynor astutely observed, that every product comes with an
204. Id. § 2-314(2)(b) (fungible goods).
205. Id. § 2-314(2)(c).
206. Id. § 2-314(2)(e).
207. Id. § 2-314(2)(c); see also Hardman v. Helene Curtis Indus., 198 N.E.2d 681, 691
(Ill. App. Ct. 1964); Maybank v. S.S. Kresge Co., 266 S.E.2d 409,412 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980),
modified on other grounds, and afjd, 273 S.E.2d 681 (N.C. 1981); Logan v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 219 S.E.2d 685, 687 (Va. 1975).
208. See U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 13 (1990).
209. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965).
210. U.C.C. § 2-314(1)-(2) (1990).
211. See id. § 2-607(3).
212. See id. § 2-316(2)-(3).
213. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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"implied warranty of safety '214 which, if breached, enables the consumer
to recover without regard to what kind of defect caused the harm. The
implied warranty of safety is particularly appropriate for a mature technolog-
ical society in which the consumer has little or no opportunity to discern the
product's safety. A product that causes harm is, by definition, not safe.
Stated another way, a safe product would not harm its user. Under a
causative liability regime, every product would carry an implied warranty
of safety. A manufacturer who supplied a product that caused harm would
therefore be legally at fault and held accountable.
D. Statutory Strict Liability
Modem strict liability is sometimes imposed by federal or state laws
designed to provide compensation to plaintiffs for injuries where proof of
negligence would be virtually impossible. For example, the Black Lung
Benefits Act 5 established a trust fund to pay death and disability benefits
to coal miners who contracted Black Lung Disease (pneumoconiosis).
216
Benefits are automatically payable upon proof of harm and causation.2 7
Indeed, the Act goes even further and creates a rebuttable presumption of
causation if the claimant worked in coal mines for ten years or more. 1
A death benefits claimant who proves that the deceased worked in mines for
twenty-five years or more can recover without introducing any proof of
causation unless the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that the death was not mine-related.21 9 The goal of the black lung statute
is clearly compensation. Congress was concerned that the difficulty of
proving causation impeded miners' ability to recover under normal workers'
compensation rules.220
Another illustration of strict liability by statute is the National Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program.221 Under this statute, claims of over
$1,000 for vaccine-related injury or death are under the jurisdiction of the
United States Claims Court, which assigns such cases to a special master for
vaccine injuries.222 A claimant whose injury falls within a specified
214. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 442 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring).
215. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-960 (1988).
216. Pneumoconiosis is a debilitating, irreversible lung disease generally caused by
long-term inhalation of coal dust. See H.R. REP. No. 563, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969),
reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2503, 2515.
217. See 30 U.S.C. § 921(a) (1988).
218. See id. § 921(c)(1).
219. See id. § 921(c)(5).
220. See id. § 901(a); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 761, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2578, 2603.
221. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to aa-34.
222. See id. § 300aa-l 1(a).
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Vaccine Injury Table223 can recover upon proof that her injury is merely
"in association with" a vaccine listed in the table. 24 Thus, claimants with
specified conditions who obtained specified vaccines may recover without
normal tort law proof of causation. In exchange for increased chances of
recovery, plaintiffs harmed by vaccines are limited to recovery of compensa-
tory damages, attorney's fees, and a maximum of $250,000 damages for
pain and suffering.22 s
Federal environmental laws appear to be the newest wave of statutorystrict liability. Strict liability has been imposed in recent years for nuclear
radiation leakage, water pollution, oil spills,228  and hazardous
waste dumping 29 in the name of public policy.
At the state level, one of the more fascinating experiments with strict
liability is the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation
Act.230 Under this Act, physicians and hospitals may elect to participate
in a fund23 that provides compensation for birth-related neurological inju-
ries. 32 Recoverable damages are limited to economic losses plus reason-
able attorney's fees; claimants can neither recover for pain and suffering nor
be awarded exemplary damages.233 Compensation is automatic upon proof
of a birth-related neurological injury and proof that the physician or hospital
participated in the fund.234 Thus, the claimant's prima facie case does not
require proof of causation. The only way the fund will be relieved of its
obligation to the claimant is if the physician or hospital can proffer evidence
that the injury is not related to birth.235 The Virginia statute essentially
presumes causation for certain neurological injuries, subject to rebuttal
evidence by the physician or hospital. In this manner, the Virginia statute
is quite similar to the federal Black Lung and Vaccine Injury statutes.
223. See id. § 300aa-14(a).
224. Id. § 300aa-I l(c)(l)(C)(i). Plaintiffs whose injury does not appear in the table
must prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at § 300aa-1 l(c)(1)(C)(i)(I).
225. Id. § 300aa-15(a), (e).
226. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210(n)(1) (West 1973 & Supp. 1994).
227. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (West 1986).
228. See Oil Pollution Control Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 2702, 2703 (West Supp.
1994); Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1653 (West 1986 & Supp.
1994).
229. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) & (2) (1988)..
230. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (Michie 1990).
231. See id. § 38.2-5020. The fund is funded by assessments on all physicians in the
state and all participating hospitals. Id.
232. See id. § 38.2-5001 (defiming "birth-related neurological injury").
233. See id. § 38.2-5009.




All of these statutes are legislative responses to the harshness of
negligence law and the difficulty of proving causation. It should be pointed
out that, under a causative liability regime, plaintiffs injured by black lung
disease, vaccines, or neurological disorders would still need these special
statutory compensation schemes because causative liability would adhere to
traditional tort law causation principles. Thus, those who claim that
causative liability is akin to a no-fault compensation scheme are simply
wrong. Statutory compensation schemes such as these go well beyond
causative liability by loosening the claimant's burden of proof on causation.
Even if causative liability were embraced by the courts, special no-fault
compensation schemes would still be useful.
E. Strict Liability in Tort
The estrangement between tort law and pure strict (i.e., causative)
liability was never complete. Even at the height of the industrial frenzy,
courts uniformly imposed tort liability upon sellers of food and drink for
any harms caused by their products.236 Causative liability for products
other than food, however, did not re-emerge until 195 1, when an Ohio court
imposed strict liability in tort on the manufacturer of a grinding wheel.237
This revivified basis of liability quickly spread to products such as hair
dye,238 permanent wave solutions,239 animal food,2" cinder building
blocks,24" ' and automobile tires.242 Dean William Prosser, the Reporter
for the Restatement (Second) of Torts, proclaimed the growth of strict
liability in tort "perhaps the most spectacular development that I have
witnesses [sic] in my lifetime in the American law of torts." '243 Had Dean
Prosser lived through the Middle Ages, however, the emergence of strict
liability in the mid-twentieth century would not have appeared so spectacu-
lar, but more like a natural re-emergence, accompanying the maturity of the
Industrial Revolution, of the causative notion of fault.
236. See, e.g., Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 93 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1939); Donaldson
v. Great At]. & Pac. Tea Co., 199 S.E. 213 (Ga. 1938); Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 176
N.W. 382 (Iowa 1920); Parks v. G.C. Yost Pie Co., 144 P. 202 (Kan. 1914); Howson v.
Foster Beef Co., 177 A. 656 (N.H. 1935); Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co., 144 A.
884 (R.I. 1929).
237. Di Vello v. Gardner Mach. Co., 102 N.E.2d 289, 293 (Ohio 1951); see also 38
A.L.I. PRoc. 71 (1962) (remarks of Dean'Prosser).
238. See, e.g., Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 269 P.2d 413 (Kan. 1954).
239. See, e.g., Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 147 N.E.2d 612 (Ohio 1958).
240. See, e.g., Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959).
241. See, e.g., Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 90 N.W.2d
873 (Mich. 1958).
242. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959).
243. 38 A.L.I. PROC. 52 (1962).
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As originally drafted, the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A
imposed strict liability only upon sellers of food. 2" At the 1961 annual
meeting of the A.L.I., however, a motion to expand the scope of section
402A to include "products for intimate bodily use" passed by a vote of 70-
34.245 The debate on this motion to expand the scope of section 402A
indicates that the A.L.I. members believed that products for intimate bodily
use included such things as clothing
246 and detergents.24 7
Two years after the A.L.I. voted to expand the Restatement (Second)
strict liability to products for intimate bodily use, the California Supreme
Court upped the ante in its landmark decision, Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.248 The Greenman court imposed strict tort liability on the
manufacturer of a power lathe that inexplicably malfunctioned, causing a
piece of wood to fly out and strike the plaintiff on the head.249 Justice
Traynor, speaking for the majority, laid down the new principle:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves
to have a defect that causes injury to a human being....
.... The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put
such products on-the market rather than by the injured persons who are
powerless to protect themselves .... Implicit in the [product's] presence
on the market ... was a representation that it would safely do the jobs for
which it was built.
250
The A.L.I. membership responded to Greenman one year later by voting
to expand the proposed Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A to
encompass all products.25 1 At the time of the A.L.I.'s vote, the vast
majority of courts had not ventured to apply strict tort liability beyond food
and products for intimate bodily use. 252 Despite this fact, several A.L.I.
members were clearly concerned that the Restatement (Second) of Torts
would be an anachronism when published if such expansion were not
244. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1961);
see also 38 A.L.I. PROC. 72-73 (1962).
245. 38 A.L.I. PROC. 72-75 (1962).
246. Id. at 73.
247. Id. at 74-75.
248. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
249. Id. at 898.
250. Id. at 900-01.
251. 41 A.L.I. PROC. 349 (1964).
252. See 41 A.L.I. PROC. 350 (1964) (remarks of Dean Prosser, who stated that only
sixteen jurisdictions had extended strict liability in tort beyond food and products for intimate
bodily use).
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adopted, 3 and the greatly expanded section 402A was passed with surprisingly
little debate.'
The post-Greenman" difficulty has been defining the prerequisites to
recovery--the terms ,defective'Mz 6 and/or "unreasonably dangerous. 7 The
final version of section 402A requires that the plaintiff prove the product was "in
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.258
Failure of the drafters to indicate whether these terms were intended to be
alternative or cumulative prerequisites to recovery has spawned much debate and
confusion. Indeed the terms "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous" seem
tautological. But Dean Prosser justified the use of both terms to his colleagues
by explaining that the term '[d]efecfive' was put in to head off liability on the
part of the seller of whiskey, on the part of the man who consumes it and gets
delirium tremens, even though thejury might find that all whiskey is unreason-
ably dangerous to the consumer.' 9 In so stating, Dean Prosser made it clear
that mere unreasonable danger alone would not suffice for liability under section
402A. Not only must the product be unreasonably dangerous (a term which
inherently "rings of negligence"26), but it must also inflict harm not normally
associated with the product.261 Thus, Dean Prosser stated that products such as
alcohol, cigarettes, and certain prescription drugs would not be subject to liability
because they would not be considered defective.262 When Professor Dickerson
observed that the addition of the term "defective" was "gilding the lily,"'263 Dean
Prosser was sympathetic: "I was rather indifferent to [the addition of 'defective'].
I thought 'unreasonably dangerous,' on the other hand, carried every meaning that
was necessary, as Mr. Dickerson does; but I could see the point, so I accepted the
change.'2
64
Despite the A.L.I. membership's apparent belief that the dual terms were
somehow distinct, the final version of section 402A defines them both in terms
of a consumer expectations test.26 Comment g defines defective condition as
"a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be
unreasonably dangerous to him."266 Comment i defines unreasonably dangerous
as "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
253. See 41 A.L.I. PROC. 350 (1964) (remarks of Dean William Prosser); id., at 353
(remarks of Mr. Bennett Boskey).
254. See id. at 349-75.
255. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
256. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(7) (1965).
257. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l) (1965).
258. Id.
259. 38 A.L.I. PRoc. 88 (1962).
260. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1162 (Cal. 1972).
261. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. h, i (1965).
262. 38 A.L.I. PROC. 87-88 (1962).
263. Id. at 87.
264. Id. at 88.
265. See RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. g, i (1965).
266. Id. § 402A cmt. g.
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ordinary consumer." '267 Thus, the comments to section 402A clearly expose the
tautology because a product which is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated" which is also necessarily in "a condition not contemplat-
ed... which will be unreasonably dangerous."
Strangely, as alluded to earlier, courts have been hesitant to apply the
consumer expectations test to design or informational defect cases,' although
the explicit language of comments g and i seem to require it. Hesitancy in
employing the consumer expectations test in non-manufacturing defect cases,
according to Professors Henderson and Twerski, is due to the fact that it is too
"open-ended and unstructured."269 This argument cannot withstand scrutiny,
however, when one considers that the substitute argued for, the risk-utility balance
test, is equally open-ended and unstructured, necessitating the delicate balancing
of an infinite number of unquantifiable factors. Indeed, it seems more reasonable
to conclude that the trier of fact, particularly a jury, will be better equipped to
determine whether a given product comports with the ordinary consumer's
expectations than to conduct the nebulous balance of the risk-utility test.
The California Supreme Court, fifteen years after Greenman,27 attempted
to carve out an acceptable compromise between advocates of the risk-utility and
consumer expectations tests for defect. In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 271
the court explicitly acknowledged that either test was acceptable.2' While this
seemed to be a perfectly reasonable compromise, one must ponder why any
compromise was required at all. After all, the Restatement (Second) language
clearly adopted the consumer expectations test for both defective and unreason-
ably dangerous products.273
From whence did the risk-utility monster come? The risk-utility test appears
to be a substitute for the consumer expectations test in cases where the defendant
argued that the product was too complex for a reasonable consumer to form
expectations. 2" This argument proves too much. True, ordinary consumers
may not have precise expectations regarding the presence or absence of roll cages
on construction equipment. Yet an ordinary consumer does expect construction
equipment not to cause harm when used in a foreseeable manner. Thus, as
alluded to earlier,275 the consumer expectations test, when fithfully applied,
amounts to the imposition of causative liability. If a product causes harm when
267. Id. § 402A cmt. i.
268. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 29, at 291-92 (noting that most courts employ
a negligence test for design defects).
269. James A. Henderson Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1534 (1992)
[hereinafter Henderson & Twerski, Proposed Revision].
270. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
271. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
272. Id. at 457-58.
273. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. g, i (1965).
274. See generally Reed Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a Product
Have to Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301, 306-14 (1967).
275. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
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used in a foreseeable manner, it fails to comport with an ordinary consumer's
expectations, and the seller is held legally responsible. No doubt this is the true
reason why defendants were eager to convince the courts that an alternative to the
consumer expectations test was needed.
Another reason recently put forth to support adoption of the risk-utility test
is that section 402A was never conceived by its authors as extending beyond
manufacturing defects.27 6 The only authority cited for this proposition appears
to be comment g, which states that strict liability shall be imposed under section
402A "where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition
not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably
dangerous to him."277 It is difficult to see how this language reveals that section
402A was perceived as a rule limited to manufacturing defects. Certainly
comment g's language is equally applicable to design or informational defects,
which are just as likely to be uncontemplated by the consumer, if not more so
because they are so often latent.
This attempt at revisionist history must fail because the landmark Green-
man2 78 cas--the im.petus for the expansion of section 402A to products beyond
food and products for intimate bodily use--apparently involved a design defect,
as did numerous other pre-402A strict liability product cases. In addition, given
that risk-utility is a negligence test, its use contravenes the explicit pronouncement
of comment a that "[t]he rule is one of strict liability .... The Section is inserted
in the Chapter dealing with the negligence liability of suppliers of chattels, for the
convenience of reference and comparison with other Sections dealing with
negligence."279 This comment makes it unmistakably clear that section 402A
was intended to be something quite different from negligence. Thus, use of a
risk-utility test as a substitute for the consumer expectations test cannot be histori-
cally justified.
IV. THE PROPOSED RESTATEAET (THRD) OF TORTS
A. Background
In 1991 the A.L.I. published a lengthy study on enterprise liability which
recommended, inter alia, that the consumer expectations test be abolished and that
an explicit negligence standard be adopted for design and informational defect
product liability cases.' The A.L.I. study was not, however, representative of
the full membership's views, but merely the views of fourteen individuals, and
276. See James A. Henderson Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Will a New Restatement Help
Settle Troubled Waters: Reflections, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1257, 1260 (1993) [hereinafter
Henderson & Twerski, New Restatement]; see also Henderson & Twerski, Proposed Revision,
supra note 269, at 1526.
277. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965).
278. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
279. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. a (1965) (emphasis added).
280. 2 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 89, at 81.
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was sharply criticized by the A.L.I. membership, the study's Advisory Group
members, and the study's Consultative Group members, as being drafted without
adequate discussion or debate."'
Despite the intense criticism, the Reporters of the Restatement (Third) of Torts
have embraced the recommendations of the A.L.I. study in their proposed
revisions to section 402A.282 The Reporters characterize the proposed revisions
as a "pragmatic and functional approach... [that] will go a long way to settling
troubled waters."2 3 They are mistaken. The proposed Restatement (Third) will
settle troubled waters only to the extent that it pacifies those on the bench or in
academia who have been unwilling or unable to accept the notion of strict liability
for products.
The Reporters have tried to downplay the fundamental sea-change reflected
in their proposed revsions by characterizing the present section 402A as
"anachronistic"'24 and proclaiming that the revised rules can be doctrinally
characterized as negligence, warranty, or strict liability.285 Technically, this
proclamation is true; words are so malleable, especially in the hands of lawyers,
that they can be employed in any manner desired. But encouraging scholars or
courts to label the proposed revisions as strict liability is misleading at best and
devious at worst. Certainly one is free to call a dog a cat, but in so doing, one
would likely lose the meaning of "dog" altogether and create much unnecessary
confusion along the way. Ironically, the Reporters previously advocated purging
the "senseless rhetoric of strict liability ... from [design] defect litigation."2"
They do not appear to have heeded their own call for clarity.
B. The Proposal
The proposed revisions to section 402A, would legitimize the current tripartite
conceptualization of defects by explicitly identifying manufacturing, design, and
informational defects and establishing separate liability standards for each. 7
Manufacturing defects would be subject to strict liability. 8 If the plaintiff can
prove that it is probable that the product failed to comport with a reasonable
consumer's expectations because of a manufacturing defect, she can invoke strict
281. See 68 A.L.I. PROC. 26-27 (1992) (remarks of Professor Shapo); see also id. at
29-30 (remarks of Mr. Bill Wagner); see also Jerry J. Phillips, Comments on the Reporters'
Study of Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 241 (1993).
282. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A (1965).
283. Henderson & Twerski, New Restatement, supra note 276, at 1261.
284. Henderson & Twerski, Proposed Revision, supra note 269, at 1513.
285. See Tentative Draft, supra note 26, § 2 cmt. j, at 30.
286. James A. Henderson Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Stargazing: The Future of
American Products Liability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1332, 1334 (1991) [hereinafter
Henderson & Twerski, Stargazing].
287. See Tentative Draft, supra note 26, § 2(a)-(c), at 9-10.
288. See id. § 2(a), at 9.
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liability and enjoy an inference of defect without proffering specific proof
thereof.289 Design defects, on the other hand, would be governed exclu-
sively by a negligence liability standard.290 Indeed, classifying the
proposed design defect language as a mere negligence standard may be too
generous. Perhaps "super" negligence would be a more appropriate label,
as the standard requires the plaintiff to prove that the product's risks could
have been reduced by a "reasonable alternative design.""29  Thus, mere
proof that a product's risks outweighed its utility will not be sufficient to
impose liability. The third type of defect, informational defect, is governed
by a negligence standard.2"
The initial question is this: Why impose strict liability on so-called
manufacturing defects but not design or informational defects? The
Reporters enumerate seven policy justifications for this dichotomy: (1) strict
liability will encourage greater investment in safety; (2) internalization of
manufacturing defect costs will provide consumers with the knowledge
needed to make rational purchasing decisions; (3) lower litigation costs; (4)
the difficulty of proving negligence; (5) the failure of a product with such
a defect to comport with consumer expectations; (6) the superior knowledge
of risks by the manufacturer imposes non-reciprocal risks on the consumer;
and (7) risk spreading.
93
These are sound reasons indeed for adopting a strict liability regime.
What the Reporters fail to point out, however, is that these policy justifica-
tions are equally applicable to design and informational defect litigation.
Further, when one considers that the distinction between manufacturing,
design, and informational defects is tenuous at best, the desirability of
extending strict liability to all products cases is compelling.
Consider the following hypothetical, provided by the Reporters as an
illustration of a so-called manufacturing defect:
Jack purchased a bottle of AAA Champagne from the BBB Liquor Mart.
The champagne was bottled by AAA Inc. utilizing bottles manufactured by
the CCC Glass Co. While Jack was opening the bottle it suddenly
exploded, causing disfiguring cuts to his face. Expert testimony establishes
that the bottle contained a manufacturing defect and could not withstand
the pressure of the carbonization of the champagne. Both AAA and CCC
utilize the best quality control techniques available in their manufacturing
process. The defect in the bottle was latent and could not reasonably have
been discovered by BBB. AAA, BBB, and CCC are subject to liability
289. See id. § 3, at 80.
290. See id. § 2(b), at 9; see also id. § 2 cmt. c, at 15.
291. Id. § 2(b), at 9.
292. See id. § 2(c), at 9-10; see also id. § 2 cmt. f, at 24.
293. See id. § 2 cmt. a, at 10-14.
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even though reasonable care was exercised in the preparation and
marketing of the defective bottle of Champagne."'
If one steps back and views this hypothetical with a critical eye, it is
easy to characterize it as an illustration of a so-called design defect. Rather
than immediately pigeonholding the bottle's frailty as a failure to conform
to the manufacturer's ideal design, it is just as reasonable to contend that the
frail bottle nonetheless conformed to the manufacturer's intended design
because the manufacturer's conscious quality control decisions invariably
contemplated that one out of every X bottles would be frail. Thus, since the
frail bottle arguably conformed to the manufacturer's intended design, it
contained not a manufacturing defect, but a design defect,29 albeit one
that manifests itself only aberrationally.
But assuming arguendo that the distinction between manufacturing,
design, and informational defects is valid, what justifications do the
Reporters offer for testing them so differently? Comment b to proposed
section 2 offers five justifications: (1) design defects cannot be defined in
the same manner as manufacturing defects; (2) consumers are the "best risk
minimizers" in the design defect situation, thereby necessitating a balancing
of risks and utilities of the product before liability is imposed; (3) design
safety decisions are not as consciously made as quality control (i.e.,
manufacturing) decisions; (4) inability to obtain insurance coverage if
liability is imposed for unforeseeable risks associated with design defects;
and (5) fairness to the manufacturer, who has a right "to be judged by a
normative behavior standard to which it is reasonably possible for manufac-
turers to conform.
296
1. Criticisms of the Tripartite Defect Paradigm
These arguments deserve to be closely examined. First, the argument
that design defects cannot be defined using a consumer expectations test is
unsupportable when one considers that the alternative test proposed, the risk-
utility test, is far more difficult for a jury to understand and effectively
employ. A reasonable juror inherently understands a reasonable consumer's
expectations concerning a product, but may well not be able to balance
unquantifiable risks against unquantifiable benefits. The real beef with the
consumer expectations test is not that it is unworkable but that it is
tantamount to causative liability.297
294. Id. § 2 cmt. b, illus. 1, at 14-15.
295. See id. § 2(a), at 9 (describing manufacturing defect as a "depart[ure] from [the
product's] intended design .... ) (emphasis added).
296. See id. § 2 cmt. a, at 11-13.
297. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, the fact that the Reporters have included consumer expectations
as one factor to be considered in a design's risk-utility balance29 implicit-
ly acknowledges that consumer expectations can be discerned. Why the
Reporters do not confess their true reason for rejecting the consumer
expectations test is unclear. Perhaps condemning the test as unworkable
would simply raise fewer eyebrows than confessing a distaste for causative
liability in design defect cases while simultaneously employing it in
manufacturing defect cases. Ironically, the preferred substitute for consumer
expectations- risk-utility-was considered by the Reporters in a 1991 law
review article to be "unadjudicable" and "ask[ing] more of courts than they
can deliver."2 99 The proposed Restatement (Third) represents an abrupt
about-face, wholeheartedly endorsing the risk-utility test as "necessary" in
design defect cases."
Why the intellectual flip-flop? Perhaps one motivation is the addition
of a requirement that design defect plaintiffs prove a reasonable alternative
design. 0' If no feasible alternative design exists, the argument goes,
imposing liability is tantamount to a judicial ban of the entire product
category.30 2 The response to this argument is that imposition of liability
is never analogous to banning a product design. The manufacturer is always
free to continue marketing the design, although he will be forced to
internalize the costs of those injuries for which the consumer successfully
litigates or reaches settlement. Of course, most injured consumers will
never initiate litigation or seek compensation, particularly if the injury is
minor and the consumer has medical insurance.3 3 For example, a 1991
report conducted by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice found that of those
consumers claiming to have been injured by a product, only nine percent
even considered filing suit, and only one percent actually hired an attorney
for advice.3 "M Similarly, a study by the Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission found that fewer than three percent of consumers injured by
products ever filed a claim to seek compensation.30 ' Even assuming that
consumers injured by design defects file lawsuits, their likelihood of
winning is, on average, only thirty-five to forty percent.
298. See Tentative Draft, supra note 26, § 2 cmt. e, at 23-24.
299. Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier, supra note 11, at 1305.
300. See Tentative Draft, supra note 26, § 2 cmt. a, at 11.
301. See id. § 2(b), at 9; see also Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier, supra
note 11, at 1299, 1308 n.164.
302. See Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier, supra note 11, at 1299-1300,
1308 n.164.
303. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES
IN THE UNITED STATES 109-20 (1991).
304. See 1 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 89, at 269.
305. See id. at 399.
306. See INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY FINAL REPORT, U.S.
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Thus, imposing liability for a design defect by one court in one case is
not tantamount to a ban on a product design. Rather, it is a determination
that as between the plaintiff and the defendant at bar, the defendant should
bear legal responsibility for the harm caused by the product, regardless of
the existence of feasible design alternatives. Manufacturers who must bear
legal responsibility for defective designs may well choose to continue
marketing the product. They may be able to absorb the expected liability
costs and continue to operate their businesses profitably.
The degree of harm that normally results from the defect likely will be
a significant factor in determining whether a defectively designed product
remains on the market. If the degree of harm normally resulting from the
defect is high, injured consumers will bring suit more often, and any
compensation they receive will be commensurately high. Thus, a manufac-
turer who markets a defectively designed product with the potential for
inflicting grievous harm may find it more profitable to cease production.
This is not an unreasonable decision for the courts to foist upon the
manufacturer of such a product, and, in the end, it is the marketplace that
ultimately drives the manufacturer's decision, not the courts.
The second reason given by the Reporters of the proposed Restatement
(Third) of Torts for differentiating between manufacturing and design defects
is that consumers are the "best risk minimizers" in the design defect
situation." 7 The basic argument is that remedying many design defects is
so costly, either in aesthetic, product usefulness, or pure monetary terms,
that consumers can more cheaply prevent injuries than the manufacturer.3 8
But how is this so? How can the average consumer prevent being harmed
by a defectively designed product? Presumably, consumers could exercise
greater care in the use and selection of products. If, however, a negligence
regime is imposed on design defects, some harms caused by the product will
not be internalized, the cost of the product will not accurately reflect the
product's risks, and the consumer will not have the information necessary
to select carefully. Thus, the argument must be based upon the theory that
DEP'T OF COMMERCE 11-54 (1977) (plaintiff success rate of 51% in federal and state trial and
appellate courts in eight states surveyed from 1965 to 1976); LANDES & POSNER, supra note
29, at 303, 306 (plaintiff success rate of 38.95% in federal appellate courts and 34% in state
trial courts from Jan. 1982 - Nov. 1984); Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson Jr.,
Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 731, 741 (1992) (39%
plaintiff success rate in 1989); James A. Henderson Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet
Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REv.
479, 545 (1990) (plaintiff success rate of 32.5% in 1987).
307. See Tentative Draft, supra note 26, § 2 cmt. a, at 12.
308. Id. "Many risks can be eliminated only by excessively sacrificing product features
that make the products useful and desirable. For such risks, users and consumers are the best
risk minimizers." Id. at 11-12.
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risk can be more cheaply avoided if plaintiffs exercise greater care in using
products.
This argument is valid only to the extent that a given jurisdiction does
not take a plaintiff's misconduct into account in determining a product
manufacturer's liability. In the vast majority of jurisdictions, foreseeable
30911 1plaintiff misuse, modification,"' or contributory negligence.. will
reduce or bar recovery. Thus, to the extent that a plaintiffs own careless-
ness contributes to her harm, she generally will not be permitted to recover,
providing a built-in incentive to use products with care. Beyond the
economic incentives, however, lies the strongest incentive for a consumer
to use a product with care: the prospect of personal injury. No doubt the
overwhelming majority of consumers consider this possibility when
contemplating the degree of care required in using a product.
If one agrees that the current legal regimes and the desire to avoid injury
generally provide an appropriate incentive for the reasonable consumer to
use products with care, how can it be that imposing liability on consumers
will reduce risks more cheaply than imposing liability on manufacturers?
After all, in the vast majority of design and informational defect situations,
the design defect creates a latent danger, such as an excessively porous
metal support, inadequate crash protection, inadequate flame retardant, or
carcinogenic propensity. These are just a few examples of defects that
consumers are unable to detect and unable to avoid, at any cost. Because
these risks are so often nonreciprocal, strict liability makes more sense than
a negligence regime. Indeed, the most spectacular products cases of recent
years have involved latent defects: asbestos," 2 toxic shock syndrome,3"3
the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device,31 4 DES,3 5 silicone gel breast
implants,1 6 and the Ford Pinto. 7 How does imposing liability on the
309. See, e.g., Dugan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 454 N.E.2d 64 (Il1. App. Ct. 1983).
310. See, e.g., Anderson v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Corp., 739 P.2d 1177 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1987); Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div., Package Mach. Co., 403 N.E.2d 440 (N.Y.
1980).
311. See, e.g., Parris v. M.A. Bruder & Sons, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Pa. 1966);
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978).
312. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1335-40 (5th
Cir. 1985) (discussing nature and scope of asbestos litigation), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022
(1986); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974).
313. See, e.g., O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
314. See, e.g., Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984) (en banc);
Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210 (Kan. 1987).
315. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980).
316. See, e.g., Toole v. McClintock, 778 F. Supp. 1543 (M.D. Ala. 1991).
317. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
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users of these products more cheaply minimize risk? Indeed, how can risk
be minimized at all by users of such products if they are not even aware of
the risks? In such latent defect situations, the user can minimize risk only
by avoiding the product altogether, a very costly way to avoid risk, both in
terms of macroeconomics and individual freedom.
A third reason proferred by the Restatement (Third) Reporters for
treating design and informational defects differently from manufacturing
defects is that "[t]he element of deliberation in setting appropriate levels of
design safety cannot be analogized to the settings of levels of quality control
by the manufacturer."3 I To begin with, quality control is merely a subset
of overall design safety. A manufacturer makes conscious decisions about
product design-what materials to use, what the size and cost of the product
should be, what machines will be needed to assemble it, how many
operators will be employed and in what capacity, and how much deviation
from ideal specifications will be tolerated. All of these considerations are
part of a product's overall design, and all are deliberately determined.
To be sure, a design will possess risks that cannot be foreseen by a
reasonable manufacturer. But neither can these risks be foreseen by the
product user whose knowledge is undoubtedly inferior to that of the
manufacturer. Thus, given that accidents happen and that accidents cannot
be foreseen, who should bear legal responsibility for them? Short of
socialization of product-related injuries via a no-fault nonjudicial compensa-
tion scheme, two parties may bear the ultimate responsibility: the manufac-
turer with superior knowledge who placed the product in the stream of
commerce for profit, or the consumer with inferior knowledge who relied
on the product's implied warranty of safety. Between the two, the
manufacturer is the more culpable party to whom legal responsibility should
attach.
The fourth argument put forth for judging manufacturing and design
defects by a different legal standard is that imposing strict liability for
design defects would render product liability insurance unobtainable. The
insurability of a risk undoubtedly hinges upon the ability to accurately
estimate the risk. The less accurately a risk can be estimated, the greater the
risk assumed by the insurer and the higher the premium will be. Critics of
strict liability for design defects argue that because such defects are often
unforeseeable, the risks are unpredictable and incapable of accurate
estimation. The concern is not really that liability insurance for design
defects would be unobtainable in a strict liability regime but that it would
be unaffordable.
First, it should be noted that, as a function of tort law, the products
liability insurance crisis of the 1980s has passed, if it ever existed at all.
Most observers seem to agree that it was precipitated not by changes in
318. See Tentative Draft, supra note 26, § 2 cnt. a, at 13.
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legal doctrine, but by normal underwriting cycles.319 Second, the foresee-
ability of risk is in the eyes of the beholder. The predictability of risk is
dependent upon the amount of time and money a manufacturer is willing to
invest in a given product. Insurers are aware of the level of investment
manufacturers have made in the design of products. While insurers may not
be able to predict with complete accuracy the risks inherent in a given
product design, they can certainly provide a calculated and educated estimate
in most instances, which is precisely what insurers are in the business of
doing. At a minimum, the resulting degree of harm is generally predictable,
whether design or manufacturing defects are involved.
If insurers determine that the risk is too unpredictable, they will either
refuse to insure the product or will offer insurance at a correspondingly high
price. The result will be that the manufacturer will either be forced to self-
insure, pay the high premiums, or discontinue the product. From a societal
point of view, this is a desirable consequence. Products that harbor
unknown risks with high potential for harm should either not be placed in
the stream of commerce or should at least be priced so as to inform
consumers of their risks. Manufacturers who sell such risky products should
do so at their peril.
The choices are simple: manufacturers can compensate injured victims,
victims can go uncompensated, or injured victims can be compensated by
social programs. The insurability argument is nothing more than a straw
man designed to distract courts and academics from having to make this
fundamental choice. Whether the victim's injury is due to a design or
manufacturing defect and whether the compensation comes from an insurer
or some other source is irrelevant.
The final reason offered by the Reporters of the proposed Restatement
(Third) for differentiating between manufacturing and design defects is that
it would be unfair to judge a manufacturer by a standard other than
reasonableness.32 This argument is rather easy to dismiss because it is
hypocritical: under the proposal the reasonableness of a manufacturer's
conduct is irrevelant in manufacturing defect litigation.32' Although it is
apparently quite fair to disregard reasonableness in manufacturing defect
cases, are we to believe that it is somehow unfair to disregard reasonable-
ness in the design defect cases?
The essence of causative liability, after all, is not reasonableness of the
defendant's conduct but assignment of responsibility for harm. If X causes
harm to Y, causative liability focuses not on the reasonableness of X's
319. See 1 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 89, at 12, 271-72; 68 A.L.I. PROC.
21 (1991) (remarks of Professor Paul Weiler). See generally David J. Nye & Donald G.
Gifford, The Myth of the Liability Insurance Claims Explosion: An Empirical Rebuttal, 41
VAND. L. REV. 909 (1988) (examining trends in liability insurance payments from 1975-86).
320. See Tentative Draft, supra note 26, § 2 cmt. a, at 13.
321. See id. § 2(a).
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behavior, but upon assigning responsibility for Y's harm,322 and X is
therefore legally at fault. Y does not care whether X acted with or without
prudence. All Y knows is that X caused him harm and should be held
legally responsible. If one insists on clinging to reasonableness as a legal
standard, causative liability can be said to embrace it because it proclaims
that when X acts in a manner that causes harm, he has acted "unreasonably"
in the eyes of the law.
2. Foreseeability, State of the Art, and the Scientifically Unknown
The proposed revisions would impose, as a prerequisite for legal
liability, the foreseeability of the risk of harm posed by a design or
informational defect.323 No similar foreseeability standard is imposed for
manufacturing defects.324 Strangely, although the language clearly requires
only foreseeability of harm, the comments cryptically state that liability will
be imposed "only when the product is put to uses that it is reasonable to
expect a seller to design or warn against foreseeable use. '325 The proposal
seems to require the plaintiff to prove both foreseeability of harm and
foreseeability of use, something the majority of courts today do not
require.326
Interestingly, the comments to the proposal loosen this stringent foresee-
ability requirement for so-called mechanical products. 327  For these
products, a plaintiff would be required only to prove foreseeable use, which
would permit the trier of fact to infer foreseeable harm.328 Nonmechanical
products (presumably, inter alia, drugs and toxic chemicals) could be
322. Cf Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 116 (La. 1986) ("The
underlying reason for ... strict liability is that the person to whom society allots the
supervision, care or guardianship (custody) of the risk-creating person or thing should bear
the loss resulting from creation of the risk, rather than some innocent third person harmed
as a consequence of his failure to prevent the risk."); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods.
Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 549 (N.J. 1982) ("We impose strict liability because it is unfair for the
distributors of a defective product not to compensate its victims. As between those innocent
victims and the distributors, it is the distributors-and the public which consumes their
products-which should bear the unforeseen costs of the product.").
323. See Tentative Draft, supra note 26, § 2(b)-(c), at 9-10.
324. See id. § 2(a), at 9.
325. Id. § 2 cmt. i, at 28 (emphasis added).
326. See, e.g., Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348, 355 (Md. 1985)
(Foreseeability of use carries with it automatic foreseeability of harm.); see also Richelman
v. Kewanee Mach. & Conveyor Co., 375 N.E.2d 885, 888-89 (II1. App. Ct. 1978)
(Foreseeability of harm is all that is required.); Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11, 20 (Md.
1975) (same); cf. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 87-88 (4th Cir. 1962) (Foresee-
ability of use carries with it automatic foreseeability of harm.).




deemed defectively designed only upon proof of both foreseeable use and
foreseeable harm. Although the comments explicitly refer to this dual-
foreseeability burden in the context of informational defects, a fair
implication from the brief discussion of the issue is that it was intended to
be extended to design cases as well.
329
By requiring a plaintiff injured by a nonmechanical product to prove
foreseeability of harm, the proposed Restatement (Third) distances itself
from strict liability, the chief characteristic of which is imputed knowledge
of harm.330 Indeed, as the Supreme Court of California noted, "strict
liability as to design defects is virtually a myth" unless knowledge of
unforeseeable harm is imputed to the manufacturer.33 ' The Reporters of
the Restatement (Third) do not claim to be endorsing strict liability for
design defects; quite the contrary: they openly acknowledge that they
advocate a negligence regime.332 But they also claim that their proposals
restate current design defect law.333 This is not true. Courts that have
adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts3' have created
a hybrid between pure strict (i.e., causative) liability and pure negligence by
imputing knowledge of harm to the manufacturer (a strict liability character-
istic) and then asking whether the omniscient manufacturer acted reasonably
in placing the product in the stream of commerce (a negligence test). Thus,
the current majority view on design defects is a kind of strict negligence in
which reasonableness of conduct is judged from the perspective of an
omniscient manufacturer.
The proposed Restatement (Third), by refusing to impute knowledge of
harm, is a giant step backwards from current law. It is a descent from strict
negligence to simple negligence and is therefore not a true "restatement" of
current design defect law. This dramatic change was discovered by one
alert A.L.I. member during the recent discussions on the 1991 A.L.I.
enterprise liability study, which also advocated a return to a negligence
regime:
In calling the strict liability design defects test applied in America today
a negligence standard, I think the Reporters have made a serious .error,
329. See id.
330. See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or. 1974); see also
Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., 709 P.2d 876, 881 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc); Halphen v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 117 (La. 1986); Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 385
(N.J. 1984), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992). See generally W. Page Keeton, Product
Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 39 (1973); John W. Wade, On
the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 835 (1973).
331. Keeton, supra note 330, at 39.
332. See Henderson & Twerski, Stargazing, supra note 286, at 1334.
333. See Henderson & Twerski, Proposed Revision, supra note 269, at 1546;
Henderson & Twerski, New Restatement, supra note 276, at 1261.
334. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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because in a number of reports, a majority have imputed knowledge of risk
.... By suggesting that the [current] test for design defect is a negligence
test, you are missing that very important point.
335
The proposal appears to retreat from imputed knowledge only for
nonmechanical products. 336  Although the term "nonmechanical" is not
defined, the comments intimate that it would encompass such things as
prescription drugs and toxic chemicals. 337 However, the term is sufficient-
ly broad to also encompass over-the-counter drugs, cosmetics, soap, shoes,
clothing, kitchen utensils, asbestos, furniture, hair dye, deodorant, toothpaste,
contact lenses, furniture polish, coat hangers, tampons, IUDs, and household
cleaning products, just to name a few. If one takes literally the term
"nonmechanical product," the proposal's retreat from the use of imputed
knowledge is much more significant than the comments reveal.
In their quest to provide what amounts to a development risks defense
for prescription drugs and toxic chemicals, the Reporters have deprived
plaintiffs injured by a wide array of products of the benefit of imputed
knowledge that they now enjoy.33 A liability regime which requires the
plaintiff to prove foreseeability of harm at the time a product is marketed is
a regime of pure negligence. Thus, the proposed revisions provide
nonmechanical products with a development risks defense whereby no
liability is imposed if the plaintiff cannot prove the supplier could foresee
the harm. A supplier of furniture polish, for example, would not be liable
for design or informational defects unless the plaintiff could prove that the
supplier could foresee harm at the time the product was marketed.
The proffered justification for allowing a development risks defense for
nonmechanical products is that "[t]he harms that result from unforeseeable
risks-for example, in the human body's reaction to a new drug, medical
device, or chemical-are not a basis of liability. '" 339 This justification is
clearly circular: liability for unforeseeable harms cannot be imposed because
unforeseeable harms are not a basis of liability. The other proffered
justifications-the unavailability of insurance for unforeseeable risks and
fairness-have already been addressed and found lacking.3"
Curiously, the Reporters acknowledge that imposing strict liability on
design defects "might foster increased manufacturer investment in safe-
335. 68 A.L.I. PROC. 47 (1991) (remarks of Mr. Malcolm E. Wheeler).
336. See Tentative Draft, supra note 26, § 2 cmt. i, at 29.
337. See id.
338. Development risks are those risks which are scientifically undiscoverable by
reasonable efforts at the time a product is placed on the market. See Stapleton, supra note
89, at 411; see also Dr. Hans C. Taschner, European Initiatives: The European Communities,
in COMPARATIVE PRODUCT LIABILITY 10-12 (C.J. Miller ed., 1986).
339. See Tentative Draft, supra note 26, § 2 cmt. i, at 29.
340. See supra notes 319-21 and accompanying text.
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ty."34 Yet they then proclaim such investment to be merely "a matter of
guesswork."342 The incentive to design safe products provided by a strict
liability regime is not speculative; it is a matter of common sense.
Manufacturers who know they will have to compensate all users injured by
their products will have a strong incentive to make their products as safe as
possible. They will likely invest more, not less, in research and develop-
ment to avoid causing harm. They will strive to foresee as much as possible
to ward off future liability. In a negligence regime, by contrast, the product
manufacturer will invest only that amount in safety which is necessary to
bring him within the realm of reasonableness; he has no incentive to
discover the currently unforeseen because he will not be liable for it.
The most common argument against imposing liability for unforeseeable
harm is that it seems to impose no-fault liability upon product manufactur-
ers. There are two counterarguments to this proposition. First, tort law is
not uniformly based upon the reasonableness definition of "fault," as is
evidenced, inter alia, by the doctrines of abnormally dangerous activi-
ties,343 vicarious liability,3" defamation,345 and nuisance.346 Indeed,
because negligence measures fault from the perspective of the hypothetical
reasonable person, it implicitly imposes absolute liability on the individual
whose character or intelligence causes him to fall below this normative
standard.
Second, as was discussed at the beginning of this Article, fault was
historically viewed not as a declaration of moral culpability, but one of
causal responsibility. We should hold a supplier of a defectively designed
product liable for unforeseeable harm, not because he possesses culpable
mens rea, but because society has determined that he is to be held legally
at fault for marketing a product that resulted in harm to users. Between the
341. See Tentative Draft, supra note 26, § 2 cmt. a, at 13.
342. Id.
343. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-524A (1977).
344. See, e.g., Wood v. Central Ark. Milk Producers Ass'n, 349 S.W.2d 811 (Ark.
1961) (holding employer vicariously liable for employee's act in furtherance of business
despite explicit prohibition by employer of such conduct); Jefferson v. Rose Oil Co., 232 So.
2d 895 (La. Ct. App. 1970) (employer held vicariously liable for intentional shooting by
employee who was attempting to collect payment from customer).
345. While defamation is a strict liability offense at common law, the First
Amendment has been interpreted as circumscribing the imposition of strict liability in certain
contexts. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964).
346. See, e.g., Valley Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Preece, 406 S.W.2d 413 (Ky. Ct. App.
1966) (affirming nuisance damage award against poultry raiser despite conformance to
highest standards of care); Meat Producers, Inc. v. McFarland, 476 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1972) (holding that certain enterprises must internalize costs of harm inflicted on
neighbors irrespective of the exercise of due care).
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supplier and the consumer, the supplier is more blameworthy than the
consumer and must shoulder legal responsibility for the harm. Thus,
causative liability and fault are not mutually exclusive concepts. Indeed,
this is precisely the rationale that has long been accepted for manufacturing
defects in which foreseeability of harm is irrelevant. There is no compelling
reason why foreseeability of harm should be considered dispensable for so-
called manufacturing defects yet indispensable for so-called design and
informational defects. Such blatant lack of uniformity is unsupportable.
3. The "Special" Case of Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices
(a) Background
Comment k of the current section 402A states:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge,
are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use
.... Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper
directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably danger-
ous .... The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they
are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where
the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate
consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to
supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended
with a known but apparently reasonable risk."
This language has been the subject of great disagreement. One view is
that comment k was intended to preclude design defect strict liability for
some 348 or all 349 prescription drugs. This intent is not apparent from
either the language of comment k itself or from historical sources. During
the A.L.I. floor discussion preceding the adoption of comment k, the drafter
of the comment, Dean Prosser, clearly limited his references to "experimen-
tal" drugs only.350 More striking, however, is the fact that a formal
motion was put to the A.L.I. membership to exclude all prescription drugs
from the black letter of section 402A, but it failed. 351' Furthermore, a
347. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
348. See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 383 (N.J. 1984) (Comment k
precludes design defect strict liability only for prescription drugs determined to be
unavoidably unsafe on a case-by-case basis.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992).
349. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988) (comment k
precludes design defect strict liability for all prescription drugs).
350. See 41 A.L.I. PROC. 359-60 (1964).
351. 38 A.L.I. PROC. 97 (1961).
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motion to declare, in the comments to section 402A, that all prescription
drugs were intended to be excluded also failed.
352
The reason for rejecting these attempts to provide a blanket exemption
from strict liability for prescription drugs was expressed by one A.L.I.
member this way:
Now, I think the proposal being made here [to exempt all prescription
drugs] woild result in a situation in which a plaintiff, although he could
show that there was a defect and that the condition was unreasonably
dangerous, still could not recover merely because he happened to be
dealing with a drug, and I think that would be outrageous. I respectfully
submit that the fact that we are dealing with drugs, something that a
layman doesn't know anything about, is all the more reason why the
consumer who uses the drug needs protection of this kind. The fact that
it is a drug makes the need for this rule all the more imperative.353
Thus, the courts that have interpreted comment k as being intended to
prohibit the imposition of strict liability for prescription drug design defects
are simply wrong. The A.L.I. membership considered such an exemption
and unequivocally rejected it.
The Reporters of the Restatement (Third) clearly have a different view.
Not only do they believe prescription drugs should enjoy immunity from
strict liability design litigation, but they also believe immunity should extend
to prohibit negligent design litigation as well.354  Thus, the Reporters
would prefer that plaintiffs injured by defectively designed prescription
drugs be entirely precluded from recovery because they find the risk-utility
test "unworkable. ' 355  Strangely, the risk-utility test is touted as more
"certain" and "structured" than the consumer expectations test in non drug-
related design cases.3 56  Yet, as applied to drug-related cases-whether
based on negligence or strict liability-the risk-utility test suddenly loses
respectability. Considering that the risk-utility test is only a slight mutation
of the negligence test, B < PL, the Reporters' condemnation of risk-utility
condemns the entire law of negligence.
In various law review articles, the Reporters express their reasons for
prohibiting prescription drug design litigation. In one article, they proclaim
that drug design litigation constitutes "second-guessing the Food and Drug
Administration. '357 Thus, the Reporters advocate complete immunity for
prescription drugs and medical devices that comply with FDA regulations.
If taken to its logical extreme, this argument would prohibit litigation for
352. Id. at 97-98.
353. Id. at 97 (remarks by Mr. Farage) (emphasis added).
354. See Henderson & Twerski, Proposed Revision, supra note 269, at 1544.
355. Id. at 1544-45.
356. Id. at 1534.
357. Henderson & Twerski, New Restatement, supra note 276, at -1266.
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any product regulated by the FDA, including food, cosmetics, animal drugs,
medical devices, and over-the-counter drugs. And why stop with the FDA?
Why not also preclude product design litigation for products regulated by
other government agencies as well? And why stop with design defect
litigation? Why not also preclude manufacturing defect litigation? Or
informational defect litigation since advertisements are regulated by the
Federal Trade Commission? The slope is slippery indeed. Are consumers
willing to give up their right to litigate injuries simply because an under-
funded and overworked federal agency has issued regulations? Clearly the
answer is "no." Because of the significant implications for cutting off
access to the courts, any government compliance defense, no matter how
circumscribed, is more appropriately a decision to be made by the legisla-
tive, not the judicial, branch.
Another reason profferred by the Reporters for providing design defect
immunity for prescription drug manufacturers is the so-called learned
intermediary doctrine. They state that "the overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions have taken the position that a court is not to substitute its
judgment for that of the prescribing physician regarding the design of a
prescription drug."35 This is an inaccurate characterization of the learned
intermediary doctrine. The learned intermediary doctrine simply holds that
the responsibility for providing adequate warnings about a drug more
appropriately rests with the prescribing physician rather than the drug
manufacturer." 9 The manufacturer's duty to warn is limited to adequately
advising the prescribing physician."W Thus, the learned intermediary
doctrine has no relevance to design litigation at all. No one seriously doubts
that it is the drug manufacturer, not the physician, who must bear responsi-
bility for drug design.
(b) The "One Patient" Rule
Fortunately for consumers, the Reporters have not incorporated all of
their wish list for prescription drugs into the proposed Restatement (Third).
Nonetheless, the proposal calls for a substantial change from current law.
Essentially, the proposal would limit a prescription drug or a medical device
manufacturer's liability to manufacturing defects, negligent failure to warn,
and an extremely limited liability for negligent design.36' The bottom line
358. Henderson & Twerski, Proposed Revision, supra note 269, at 1522 (emphasis
added).
359. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1096 (1974); McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 529 (Or. 1974).
360. Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276; McEwen, 528 P.2d at 529.
361. See Tentative Draft, supra note 26, § 4(b), at 88-89.
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is that under the new proposal, "liability is likely to be imposed only under
unusual circumstances. '"362
Extension of this broad immunity to medical devices is enigmatic. The
Reporters' comments proclaim that both medical devices and prescription
drugs are currently judged by negligence standards, yet they cite only eight
decisions from six jurisdictions as authority-clearly not a majority posi-
tion.363 Given the ubiquity of medical devices in current products liability
litigation, the proposed Restatement (Third) would effectively squelch the
chances of recovery for those harmed by medical devices such as silicone
breast implants, the Bjork-Shiley heart valve, and the Dalkon Shield. More
careful consideration is required before medical devices are added to a list
of immunized product manufacturers.
One justification recited for immunizing prescription drug manufacturers
from design litigation is that they contain unforeseeable risks due to
interaction with the mysterious human body. Even assuming, arguendo, that
this is a legitimate concern, one must ponder whether this justification holds
true for medical devices. The malfunction of the Bjork-Shiley heart valve,
for example, has nothing to do with unforeseeable consequences of human
implantation. Rather, it is simply a case of a design inadequacy that caused
a life-threatening strut fracture in the valve.3" Similarly, design defects
in medical devices such as insulin infusion pumps, cardiac monitors and
defibrillators, balloon catheters, and lithotripters have the potential for
enormous harm and are as foreseeable as a defect in an automobile engine,
punch press, or electric hair dryer. Medical devices are simply mechanical
products which monitor or assist bodily functions. When they are defective,
the resulting harm is generally no more due to an unforeseeable mysterious
interaction with the human body than is the punch press which mutilates its
user's hand. Hence, the liability standard for medical devices should be no
different from any other product.
Along the same lines, one must wonder why the liability immunization
line is drawn at prescription drugs. If the argument is based upon
unforeseeable consequences of interaction with the human body, is it not
true that over-the-counter (OTC) drugs may have equally unforeseeable
hazards? Indeed, the line between many prescription and non-prescription
drugs is arbitrary. Anyone who watches television can testify to the fact
that many OTC drugs are former prescription drugs which are "now
362. Id. § 4 cmt. f, at 95.
363. See id. § 4, Reporters' Notes to cmt. d.
364. See FDA and the Medical Device Industry, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy & Commerce, H. Rep. No. 101-27,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1990), microformed on CIS No. 90-H361-51 (Congressional Info.
Serv.); see also Device Safety, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment of the Committee on Energy & Commerce, H. Rep. No. 10 1-157, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 57-68 (1989), microformed on CIS No. 91-H361-7 (Congressional Info. Serv.).
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available without a prescription." Why is it that the manufacturer of a drug
must face dramatically expanded liability when he decides to obtain FDA
approval to market it over-the-counter? Does not such a double standard
provide a strong disincentive for manufacturers to attempt to seek OTC
status for their drugs? If so, will this not hurt the economy and consumer
freedom by producing fewer OTC drugs from which to choose? If such a
liability standard does not provide a disincentive to seek OTC classification,
does this not indicate that the difference between negligence and strict
liability is not so severe that it would distort normal marketplace decision-
making?
The potential for broadening the immunity from design defect liability
beyond prescription drugs is enormous. Many modem products interact
with the human body and pose hazards which are unforeseen, particularly
if long-term exposure is anticipated. Pesticides, cosmetics, processed foods,
and OTC drugs are all arguably plagued by unforeseen risks. Yet, surely no
one would advocate that the manufacturers of these products be immunized
from design defect liability. By proposing to immunize prescription drug
and medical device manufacturers, the Reporters of the Restatement (Third)
of Torts have opened a Pandora's box. Logic and fairness dictate an all-or-
nothing choice: either all such products should be immunized from design
defect liability, or none should be. Given that the consumers of such
products face highly nonreciprocal risks and that providing stringent incen-
tives to safety is particularly desirable in this context, a causative liability
regime is preferable to a negligence regime.
It must also be noted, however, that the proposed Restatement (Third)
is not so generous as to permit a negligence regime for prescription drug
and medical device design defects. The liability standard for design defects
is a very stingy mutation of negligence, creating essentially a "one patient
rule." Under the one patient rule, a manufacturer of a prescription drug or
medical device cannot be liable-even if the plaintiff proves the risks
outweigh utility-so long as a reasonable medical provider would prescribe
the drug or device for "any class of patients." '365 The implications of the
rule are clarified in the comments:
What may be harmful to one patient may be beneficial to another.... [A]
drug is defectively designed only when it provides no net benefit to any
class of patient. As long as a drug or medical device provides net benefits
to some persons under some circumstances ... the drug or device manu-
facturer should simply be required to instruct and warn health care
providers of the risks and benefits."6
365. See Tentative Draft, supra note 26, § 4(b)(4), at 89.
366. Id. § 4 cmt. b, at 90 (emphasis added).
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Thus, if there is any patient for whom a reasonable medical provider
would deem the drug or device beneficial, all other user patients are
precluded from litigating the issue of design defect under negligence or strict
liability, "even if it is excessively harmful to [those] patients. 3 67 The one
patient rule is a radical departure from current law. It not only precludes
strict design defect liability, but also negligence liability so long as one
patient could benefit from the drug or device.
The practical effect of the one patient rule cannot be overstated. Once
a drug or medical device enters the market and becomes the drug or device
of choice for a group of patients and their (presumably) reasonable
physicians, the drug or device can never be declared defective in design, no
matter how much harm it inflicts on other users. Some examples may help
illuminate the enormity of the rule. If the one patient rile were in effect a
few decades ago, Thalidomide users could never have recovered for
negligent or strict liability design defect because Thalidomide was prescribed
by reasonable medical providers for the treatment of inflammatory skin
diseases and leprosy.3 6 Likewise, today's victims of silicone gel breast
implants would not be able to recover for design defect because reasonable
medical providers still provide the implants for certain mastectomy pa-
tients.3 69  DES victims could not recover because reasonable medical
providers prescribed DES for non-pregnancy uses and as a morning-after
contraceptive.370 The list could go on and on. So long as a reasonable
medical provider would prescribe the drug or device knowing of the risks
at the time of sale,37' the manufacturer is immune from design liability.
Thus, discoveries about the hazards of a drug or device subsequent to time
of sale are not relevant to the inquiry. The question is not whether a
reasonable medical provider with 20/20 hindsight would prescribe the drug
or device to a patient, but whether she would have prescribed it to a patient
367. Id. at 91.
368. See Luc Thomas et al., Successful Treatment of Adult's Langerhans Cell
Histiocytosis with Thalidomide: Report of Two Cases and Literature Review, 129 ARCH. OF
DERMATOLOGY 1261 (1993); Andrew A. Skolnick, Last USPHS Leprosy Hospital Phasing
Out; Research Relocating to University, 267 JAMA 2287 (1992).
369. See Marsha F. Goldsmith, Image of Perfection Once the Goal-Now Some Women
Just Seek Damages, 267 JAMA 2439, 2442 (1992) (noting that the FDA moratorium on
silicone gel breast implants still permits limited implantation for mastectomy and
augmentation purposes); Donald A. Redelmeier et al., Understanding Patients' Decisions:
Cognitive and Emotional Perspectives, 270 JAMA 72, 74 (1993).
370. See Karen A. Bussel, Note, Adventures in Babysitting: Gestational Surrogate
Mother Tort Liability, 41 DuKE L.J. 661, 684 n.154 (1991) (citing GENA COREA, THE
HIDDEN MALPRACTICE: How AMERICAN MEDICINE TREATS WOMEN AS PATIENTS AND
PROFESSIONALS 242-52 (1977)); Stephen A. Spitz, From Res Ipsa Loquitur to Diethylstilbes-
trol: The Unidentified Torfeasor in California, 65 IND. L.J. 591, 610 (1990).
371. See Tentative Draft, supra note 26, § 4 cmt. g, at 95 (foreseeability of harm refers
to time of sale).
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when the plaintiff received it. Notice that using a time of sale test requires
implicit condemnation of the plaintiff's physician: the plaintiff can recover
only if she can prove that no reasonable provider at that time would have
so prescribed; thus, her own physician must be deemed to have acted
unreasonably before she can recover. Needless to say, few instances will
arise where the prescribing physician will be deemed to have acted
unreasonably for prescribing a drug or device that was perfectly legal.
The proposal's failure to employ a time of trial standard for judging the
reasonableness of a prescription drug design translates into complete
immunity from design defect liability. If the drug or device has been legally
placed on the market, undoubtedly a reasonable medical provider will be
willing to prescribe it for one or more patients. Thus, under the one patient
rule, users who are subsequently harmed-no matter how many or how
seriously-will be unable to successfully challenge the design of the drug
or device. This is no restatement of current law. It is comment k with a
vengeance. It is a draconian departure more appropriately handled by the
public legislative process than by a back room poker game played by legal
academia.
What rationales are offered for this broad immunity? There appear to
be two. First, it is agreed that "manufacturers must have ample discretion
to develop useful drugs and devices without their design decisions being
subjected to unwarranted judicial review." '372 The underlying current in
this argument is that because drugs and devices save or improve our lives,
tort law should give manufacturers of such products a little more legal
wiggle room. Under this view, normal liability standards (i.e., those
standards imposed on all other products) unduly discourage research and
development when imposed on prescription drugs or medical devices.
This argument cannot withstand close scrutiny. Many products other
than prescription drugs and medical devices save or improve our lives. Life
preservers, heaters, processed food, ropes, nuts and bolts, and airbags can
save our lives. Yet no one seriously advocates that these products should
be immune from design defect liability. Indeed, in many ways modem
existence is so dependent upon so many products that our lives literally hang
by a thread, or screw, or nut, or wire--or drug or medical device. If design
defect liability can be imposed without unduly hampering research and
development for these other life-saving products, why not for prescription
drugs and medical devices? No one doubts that the prescription drug and
medical device industries operate quite profitably and that they are equally
capable of shouldering responsibility for harm caused by defective design
as are their counterparts who manufacture other essential products.
The second reason proffered for granting special immunity for prescrip-
tion drugs and medical devices is that "governmental regulatory agencies
adequately review new prescription drugs and devices, keeping unreasonably
372. Id. § 4 cmt. b, at 91.
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dangerous designs off the market. 3 73 Yet the FDA, the primary agency
charged with regulating prescription drugs and medical devices, approved
such products as DES, Bendectin, the Dalkon Shield, silicone gel breast
implants, the Copper-7 I.U.D., FD & C Red Nos. 2 and 32, the Bjork-Shiley
heart valve,374 and defectively designed cardiac defibrillators,3" pace-
makers,376 balloon catheters,377 kidney lithotripters,378 insulin infusion
pumps, 379  microprocessor ventilators,"O and plasmapheresis
equipment.3 1  A 1991 report by the Advisory Committee on the FDA
recognized that the common perception
by former Department officials, business and consumer representatives,
professional groups, as well as current and former FDA employees,
depicted an Agency that is overextended, underfunded, and shackled by
bureaucratic constraints.... [T]here is genuine concern that if these
problems are not squarely addressed, the Agency will be unable to fulfill
its vastly increased and critically important responsibilities in the fu-
ture.3
8 2
Is this descriptive of an agency capable of keeping defectively designed
drugs and devices off the market? Most Americans would not think so, and
they certainly would not have sufficient confidence in the FDA to trade
away their right to litigate design claims in the speculative hope of
promoting greater research and development.
One final aspect of the proposed Restatement (Third) treatment of drugs
and devices warrants discussion. The proposal rigidly adopts the learned
intermediary doctrine and would permit litigation of a negligent failure to
warn claim only in limited circumstance: when the manufacturer knew or
should have known that no learned intermediary existed.38 3 If this
373. Id.
374. See Compliance of Selected Acts Within the Jurisdiction of the Comm. on Energy
& Commerce: Food, Drug, and Related Law, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 421-23 (1989),
microformed on CIS No. 90-H361-51 (Congressional Info. Serv.).
375. See Medical Device Safety, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Environment of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 92-93 (1990),
microformed on CIS No. 91-H361-7 (Congressional Info. Serv.) (prepared statement of
Richard Kusserow, Inspector General, Dep't of Health & Human Servs.).
376. Id. at 93-94.
377. Id. at 95.
378. Id. at 98-99.
379. Id. at 99-100.
380. Id. at 100-01.
381. Id. at 102-03.
382. FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 5-6 (May 1991).
383. See Tentative Draft, supra note 26, § 4(b)(3), at 88-89.
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circumstance exists, the manufacturer could be held liable for negligent, but
not strict liability, failure to warn.384
The difficulty with the proposal is that it legitimizes the learned
intermediary doctrine in a way that denies courts the flexibility to develop
a rule of nondelegability as to drug or device warnings. Recent cases have
hinted that the learned intermediary doctrine may be anachronistic and that
a preferable approach would be to consider the duty to warn nondelegable,
incapable of being discharged merely by warning the prescribing physi-
cian. 5 While these cases can be characterized as hinging upon the
absence of a meaningful learned *intermediary because they involve mass
immunization programs or oral contraceptives, such characterization is too
simplistic. Underlying these cases is arguably a burgeoning policy of
nondelegability, a policy that the proposed Restatement (Third) would cut
off at the knees. The A.L.I. membership should, at a minimum, be
cognizant of this possible unwanted side effect.
V. A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: CONTINENTAL DRIFT
Ironically, as the United States retreats to a negligence regime for
products liability, the rest of the world is drifting toward causative liability.
This slow but steady continental drift diffuses the argument that imposing
causative liability at home will disadvantage American enterprise in the
global marketplace. It should also cause causative liability critics to pause
and consider whether a return to negligence will leave American consumers
with fewer protections than their international counterparts. A closer
examination of the products liability laws of other countries should help
provide the global perspective necessary for American law reformers to craft
a Restatement (Third) to carry the United States into the twenty-first century.
A. The European Community Directive
In 1985, after nine years of heated debate, the Council of European
Communities (EC) adopted a formal directive for member states,386
establishing strict liability for defective products.387 The Directive bluntly
384. See id. § 4 cmt. d, at 92.
385. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1096 (1974); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70 (Mass.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985).
386. There are twelve member states of the European Community: Belgium, Denmark,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and
the United Kingdom.
387. COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 85/374 OF 25 JULY 1985 ON THE APPROXIMATION OF THE
LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS OF THE MEMBER STATES
CONCERNING LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS, 1985 O.J. (L210) 29, reprinted in JERRY
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states, "The producer shall be liable for damage caused by a defect in his
product. 383 The plaintiff's prima facie case thus consists of three ele-
ments: (1) defect, (2) causation, and (3) harm.389 Once implemented by
member states via authorizing legislation; the Directive would apply to
personal or property damage of at least 500 E.C.U.' caused by any
product placed on the market after adoption.39'
In many respects, the EC Directive mirrors the current section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.392 It adopts the concept of defect as
a sine qua non to recovery and employs the consumer expectations test by
proclaiming:
A product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person
is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, including:
(a) the presentation of the product;
(b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product
would be put;
(c) the time when the product was put into circulation.393
The EC Directive embraces the notion of an implied warranty of safety
embodied in the consumer expectations test. However, to what extent
European tribunals will faithfully adhere to the consumer expectations test
remains unclear. At least one commentator has suggested that, much like
their American counterparts, European courts will ignore the explicit
language and substitute a negligence-based risk/utility test for design
defects. 394  They may be heavily influenced by American decisions,
present and future, in this respect.
The Directive differs from the proposed Restatement (Third) in a
significant way: by explicitly acknowledging the relevance of foreseeable
use, it implicitly acknowledges that foreseeability of harm is irrelevant. The
proposed American reform, by contrast, explicitly requires proof of
foreseeable risk of harm as part of a prima facie design or informational
defect case. 395  By acknowledging the irrelevancy of foreseeability of
harm, the EC Directive is faithful to the concept of strict liability, the
hallmark of which is imputed knowledge of harm.
J. PHILLIPS ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS at 913-17 (1994)
[hereinafter EC Directive].
388. EC Directive, supra note 387, at art. 1.
389. Id. at art. 4.
390. Id. at art. 9. E.C.U. refers to the European Currency Unit.
391. Id. at art. 17.
392. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
393. EC Directive, supra note 387, at art. 6(1).
394. See Stapleton, supra note 89, at 405.
395. Tentative Draft, supra note 26, § 2(b)-(c), at 9-10.
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Acceptance and use of the imputed knowledge standard may, however,
be significantly diluted if European courts determine that the language
permitting consideration of "the time when the product was put into
circulation"'396 precludes imputation of knowledge obtained after the time
of marketing. If a time-of-sale imputation emerges as the preferred
construction, the EC Directive may well amount to nothing more than a
hybrid between negligence and causative liability, in much the same manner
as the current section 402A. The time of marketing factor should more
appropriately be treated as a permissible, but not a required, factor in
determining defectiveness.
In addition to a three-year statute of limitations397 and a ten-year
statute of repose,39' a producer subject to the EC Directive399 has avail-
able six statutorily prescribed affirmative defenses:
(1) he is not the manufacturer, importer, or supplier;
(2) it is more probable than not that the defect did not exist when he
placed the product in the stream of commerce;
(3) he did not manufacture, import, or supply the product for economic
purposes;
(4) the defect is caused by mandatory compliance with a government
regulation;'
(5) development risks; or
(6) he is a component manufacturer and the defect lies with the finished
design."'
The first and third defenses address situations in which the plaintiff has
identified the wrong party or a party who does not fall within the ambit of
the Directive. The remaining defenses, except for the development risks
396. See EC Directive, supra note 387, at art. 6(l)(c).
397. Id. at art. 10(1).
398. Id. at art. 11.
399. A "producer" is defined as "the manufacturer of a finished product, the producer
of any raw material or the manufacturer of a component part and any person who, by putting
his name, trade mark or other distinguishing feature on the product presents himself as its
producer." Id. at art. 3(1). A producer also includes importers, id. at art. 3(2), and, if the
manufacturer cannot be identified, non-manufacutring suppliers. Id. at art. 3(3).
400. This defense does not provide immunity for products which comply with
government regulations, but it is limited to those rare situations in which the cause of the
harm is directly attributable to the government regulation. In other words, only if the
defendant can prove that compliance with the government regulation caused the harm will
he be immunized. Mere product conformance with government regulations, absent such
causal link, is not a recognized defense. In this respect, the defense is analogous to the so-
called "government contractor defense" which immunizes a government contractor from tort
liability when harm is caused by a design requested and approved by the United States
government. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
401. EC Directive, supra note 387, at art. 7.
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defense, address superceding or intervening causes. Thus, the one defense
available under the EC Directive that would not be permissible under a causative
liability regime is the defense for development risks.
The Directive's development risks defense specifically states that a manufac-
turer will not be held liable if "the state of scientific and technical knowledge at
the time [the manufacturer] put the product into circulation was not such as to
enable the existence of the defect to be discovered." ' 2 At the outset, it seems
plausible that inclusion of the defense indicates that compliance with state-of-the-
art, while relevant, 3 is not intended to provide a complete defense. More
importantly, the so-called development risks defense is merely an optional defense
which member states are free to disallow.4
The fact that the development risks defense is only one of two provisions
from which the member states are free to derogate' 5 belies the intense contro-
versy surrounding its adoption. As discussed above, a development risks defense
holds a product manufacturer harmless for injuries which were unknown at the
time the product was placed in the stream of commerce. A state-of-the-art
defense, by contrast, may exculpate a manufacturer who merely complies with
prevaling industry custom. Inclusion of the development risks defense is
controversial because it ignores the strict liability concept of imputed knowledge
and lessens the manufacturer's incentive to discover latent dangers. In this
manner, some have argued that adoption of the development risks defense by
member states will transform the EC Directive into "a mere exercise in 'window
dressing,"' hypocritical public homage to an impuissant strict liability god.
Despite the intense criticism, the United Kingdom 7 Germany," and
Italy 4°9 have adopted the development risks defense. The French Consumer
402. Id. at art. 7(e).
403. See id. at art. 6(l)(c) (stating that "the time when the product was put into
circulation" should be taken into account).
404. Id. at art. 15(l)(b).
405. The other optional provision is a maximum damages ceiling for death or personal
injury of 70 million E.C.U. Id. at art. 16(1).
406. Stapleton, supra note 89, at 422.
407. Consumer Protection Act, 1987, ch. 43, § 4(1)(e) Eng., reprinted in 39
HALISBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES (4th ed. 1988). The Consumer Protection
Act became effective March 1988. THE LAW REFORM COMM'N OF AUSTRALIA, REP. No.
51 AND THE LAW REFORM COMM'N OF VICTORIA, REP. No. 27, PRODUCT LIABILITY 7
(1989) [hereinafter LAW REFORM COMM'N OF AUSTRALIA].
408. See Decree No. 224, art. 6(l)(e) (May 24, 1988) (Italy), in EEC STRICT LIABILITY
1N 1992: THE NEW PRODUCT LIABILITY RULES 235, 238 (Gianni, Orgoni, Tonucci trans., PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 371, 1989). The German implement-
ing statute became effective January 1, 1990. WERNER PFENNIGSTORF, A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF LIABILITY LAW AND COMPENSATION SCHEMES IN TEN COUNTRIES AND THE
UNITED STATES 55 (Donald G. Gifford & William M. Richman eds., 1991).
409. See Francesco Gianni, Product Liability Law in Italy, in EEC STRICT LIABILITY
N 1992: THE NEW PRODUCT LIABILITY RULES, at 117, 122 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 371, 1989).
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Law Revision Committee's draft to implement the EC Directive, however, did not
include the defense.'" It is not yet clear how widely the defense ultimately will
be enacted. By mid-1995, however, the Council of European Communities must
determine whether the defense should be completely eliminated.1 American
trends in this area may be very influential.
B. European Law Beyond the EC Directive
Article Thirteen of the EC Directive makes it clear that pre-existing causes
of action are not preempted by the Directive. 2 Thus, the numerous strict
liability statutes predating the passage of the Directive will likely remain in effect.
A brief survey reveals the breadth of these laws.
Article 1384 of the French Civil Code has been interpreted by the courts to
require strict liability for a wide array of products such as bicycles, steam boilers,
automobiles, and explosives.1 3 The Civil Code of the Netherlands, modeled
after the French Civil Code, establishes strict liability for, inter alia, animals,
environmental hazards, and contractors. 414 Sweden has enacted statutory strict
liability for cattle, railroads, electricity, and aircraft." 5 In addition, it should be
noted that a 1978 Swedish law encourages pharmaceutical manufacturers to
voluntarily fund a no-fault compensation pool for those injured by drugs.416
While participation by manufacturers and consumers is voluntary, the participation
has been quite high, and consumers dissatisfied with an award can appeal or
request arbitration.417
Germany, by contrast, enacted a no-fault compensation scheme, called the
Arzneimittelgesetz, for prescription drugs, in response to the Thalidomide
tragedy.418  Germany also has statutory strict liability for aircraft, motor
vehicles, and nuclear plants.419 Switzerland, although not a member of the
European Community, is expected to adopt the EC Directive for products in
addition to retaining an extensive statutory strict liability regime for, inter alia,
410. See Genevieve Viney, The Civil Liability of Manufacturers in French Law, in
COMPARATIVE PRODUCT LIABILITY 73, 88 (C.J. Miller ed. & Philip Britton trans., 1986).
411. EC Directive, supra note 387, at art. 15(3).
412. Id. at art. 13.
413. PFENNIGSTORF, supra note 408, at 52.
414. Id. at 52, 167.
415. Id. at 52.
416. Jan Hellner, Products Liability in Swedish Law, in COMPARATIVE PRODUCT
LIABILITY 127, 133-34 (C.J. Miller ed., 1986).
417. Id.
418. See PFENNIGSTORF, supra note 408, at 56; see also Spiros Simitis, Products
Liability: The West-German Approach, in COMPARATIVE PRODUCT LIABILITY 99, 114 (C.J.
Miller ed., 1986).
419. PFENNIGSTORF, supra note 408, at 51.
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aircraft, motor vehicles, electrical installations, explosives storage, nuclear
facilities, and water pollution.420
C. Beyond Europe
1. Japan
Non-European countries are also drifting toward strict liability for prod-
ucts. For example, while Japan currently follows a negligence regime, it has
implemented strict liability for certain activities such as mines, nuclear
facilities, and environmental pollution.42'
Several influential private groups, including the Tokyo Federation of Bar
Associations, the Komei-to Party, the Japanese Socialist Party, and an
academic organization called the Group of 1990 Private Law Academy, have
recently drafted reform proposals to adopt strict liability for products.4 2
In addition, three quasi-official advisory groups put forth reform proposals
in the waning months of 1993.423 All of these proposals would adopt the
concept of defect as the liability trigger,424 and at least four would employ
the consumer expectations test to define defectiveness.4 5
The Japanese reformers also seem to agree on several provisions which,
if ultimately implemented, would place Japan among the strictest of product
liability regimes. For example, all of the four major private organization
reform proposals would shift the burden onto the product manufacturer to
prove a lack of defect or causation.4 6 Thus, an injured plaintiff would
enjoy a presumption of both defectiveness and causation, resulting in a
much lighter prima facie case than in the United States or under the EC
Directive. The Group of 1990 proposal is illustrative: "It is presumed that
there is a defect on a product when damage occurs by using the product in
a reasonably expected manner and if such damage does not usually occur in
such use."4 7  If plaintiffs can prove that they used the products in a
420. Id. at 51-52.
421. Id. at 53; see also Susumu Hirano, Comment, Drafts of the Japanese Strict
Product Liability Code: Shall Japanese Manufacturers Also Become the Insurers of Their
Products?, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 643, 643 (1992).
422. Hirano, supra note 421, at 644-45.
423. See Eugene A. Danaher, Products Liability Overhaul: Strict Liability Is Coming
to Japan, THE NAT'L L. J., Feb. 7, 1994, at 25 (the quasi-official groups are the Economic
Welfare Council, the Hosei Shingkai of the Ministry of Justice, and the Industrial Structure
Council).
424. See Danaher, supra note 423, at 25, 28 (noting that all three quasi-official groups
employ the term "defect" but differ as to the definition thereof); Hirano, supra note 421, at
649.
425. Hirano, supra note 421, at 649.




reasonably foreseeable manner and that damage does not usually occur from
such use,428 they will enjoy a presumption of defectiveness and causation
that the manufacturer must either rebut or be held liable. It should be noted,
however, that the three quasi-official reform proposals disagree with this
burden-shifting and recommend that the plaintiff's prima facie case continue
to include proof of defectiveness.429
Another stringent provision shared by the major Japanese reform
proposals is that plaintiff misconduct such as misuse, modification, or
contributory negligence would reduce the plaintiff's recovery only if it is
grossly negligent.43' By contrast, both the EC Directive43' and the
proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts432 would permit any negligent
conduct of the plaintiff to reduce or bar recovery. Also in contrast to the
EC Directive 43 and the proposed Restatement (Third),434 at least one
major Japanese proposal, put forth by the Group of 1990, would not permit
a development risks defense.
41
The Japanese Cabinet is expected to reach a consensus on reform which
will then be presented to the Japanese legislature, the Diet, sometime before
the close of 1994.436 Undoubtedly, the Japanese reformers will be closely
following the Restatement (Third) reform developments with great interest.
2. Canada
Our neighbors to the north in Canada have also begun to expand the
doctrine of strict products liability. Most Canadian provinces, as a general
rule, employ a negligence standard for products liability.437 While most
428. Presumably this language is designed to prevent inherently harmful products such
as tobacco and alcohol from being classified as defective. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965) (stating that "good whiskey" and "good tobacco" are not
unreasonably dangerous merely because they are harmful when used as intended).
429. Danaher, supra note 423, at 25.
430. Hirano, supra note 421, at 645.
431. See EC Directive, supra note 387, at art. 8(2) ("The liability of the producer may
be reduced or disallowed when, having regard to all the circumstances, the damage is caused
both by a defect in the product and by the fault of the injured person or any person for whom
the injured person is responsible.").
432. See Tentative Draft, supra note 26, § 7, at 143-44 ("When the conduct of the
plaintiff combines with a product defect to cause harm ... and the plaintiff's conduct fails
to conform to an applicable standard of care, responsibility for harm to the plaintiff is appor-
tioned between the plaintiff and the product seller pursuant to the applicable rules governing
apportionment of responsibility.').
433. See EC Directive, supra note 387, at art. 7(e).
434. See Tentative Draft, supra note 26, § 2(b)-(c), at 9-10.
435. Hirano, supra note 421, at 650.
436. Danaher, supra note 423, at 29.
437. See generally Negligence, 23 C.E.D. §§ 285-336 (Ont. 3d ed. 1994) (citing cases).
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provinces have recognized the strict liability concept of implied warranties,
the citadel of privity has not fallen in the same manner that it has in the
United States.438 Both Saskatchewan and New Brunswick, however, have
enacted special products warranty acts for consumer goods which permit
recovery, without regard to privity, against any supplier for personal or
property damage resulting from a breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability.439
Perhaps the most progressive Canadian reform effort occurred in Ontario
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the provincial Law Reform
Commission published a report recommending explicit adoption of a strict
liability regime for products."' The apparent impetus for the recommen-
dation was the questionable logic of continuing to segregate negligence from
warranty law, both of which had been highly liberalized to the point of
indistinguishability."' In the name of achieving uniformity, the Ontario
Law Reform Commission recommended that a comprehensive regime of
strict liability be adopted." 2 Although the recommendations were never
adopted, they did not go unnoticed in other parts of Canada. In 1984, the
Uniform Law Conference of Canada recommended that a uniform national
products liability law be modeled on the Ontario report." 3  Much like
efforts at nationwide products liability reform in the United States, the
Canadian uniform model law was never enacted,'0 likely a victim of
consumer group suspicion and provincial territoriality.
3. Australia
In Australia, a strong causative liability reform movement is presently
gaining momentum. The Trade Practices Act of 1974 currently permits
Australian consumers to bring suit for breach of implied product warranties,
which, unlike the United States," 5 are not generally disclaimable.'
However, much like the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A,"
the Trade Practices Act requires proof of product defect before liability can
be imposed."
438. See S.M. Waddams, The Law of Products Liability in the Common Law Provinces
of Canada, in COMPARATIVE PRODUCT LIABILITY 161, 161 (C.J. Miller ed., 1986).
439. See id. at 163-66.
440. Id. at 167.
441. Id. at 168.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 169.
444. Id.
445. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (1990).
446. LAW REFORM COMM'N OF AUSTRALIA, supra note 407, at 6.
447. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
448. See LAW REFORM COMM'N OF AUSTRALIA, supra note 407, at 6.
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In 1989, a joint report by the Law Reform Commission of Australia and
the Law Reform Commission of Victoria recommended adoption of a
causative liability regime for products in which the plaintiff's prima facie
case would consist of only two elements: causation and harm." 9 The
proposal would apply to all goods except human tissue, blood, and electric-
ity,45 ° and would impose liability on any entity in the marketing chain.51
Notably, the Law Reform Commission proposal intentionally rejected
the notion of defect as a sine qua non of recovery.452 The focus of the
Australian reform proposal, as in a causative liability regime, is on
causation. Plaintiff misconduct, acts of third parties, and force majeure
would reduce the manufacturer's liability in a manner that accounts for their
relative contribution to the harm.453 Assumption of the risk would be a
complete defense.454
One aspect of the Law Reform Commission proposal, however, is
conspicuously out of place: the inclusion of a development risks defense for
"truly undiscoverable" risks.45 5 The publicly stated motivation for includ-
ing the defense was a concern that without it, products liability insurance
would be unavailable or unaffordable.456 As pointed out earlier, however,
this "insurance crisis" argument is highly speculative.457
The speculative insurance availability benefits of the development risks
defense are more than outweighed by its costs. The defense creates severe
market distortions which cripple the stated objectives of providing an
incentive to safety, promoting informed consumer decision-making and
proper pricing via internalization of risks.458 A product whose manufac-
turer is immune from liability for undiscoverable risks will not accurately
reflect the true costs of harm. Thus, the consumer purchasing such a
product will not be given adequate information to exercise true freedom of
choice in product selection. Without consumer knowledge of risk, the risk
reciprocity gap widens into a canyon.
Why the Australian reform proposal included the development risks
defense may never be known. Perhaps fears of an insurance crisis, though
misplaced, were genuine, Perhaps inclusion of the defense was thought to
be a necessary quid pro quo to passage, a concession made in order to begin
the long journey toward meaningful reform. Whatever the case, the defense
449. See id. at 39-40; see also PFENNIGSTORF, supra note 408, at 55.
450. See LAW REFORM COMM'N OF AUSTRALIA, supra note 407, at 70-71.
451. Id. at 65.
452. Id. at 55.
453. Id. at 41-43.
454. Id. at 45.
455. Id. at 50.
456. See id. at 144.
457. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
458. See LAW REFORM COMM'N OF AUSTRALIA, supra note 407, at 15-19.
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certainly takes much out of the proposal's sting. Nonetheless, the core
concept of the Australian Law Reform Commission proposal-causative
liability without regard to defect-is a rational first step.
4. New Zealand
One final non-European country's approach to products liability should
be mentioned because it represents the farthest end of the spectrum: no-fault
compensation. Since 1972, New Zealand has had a general accident
compensation scheme for personal injury which preempts private litiga-
tion."' The plan is funded by employers, the government, and motor
vehicle owners.4" No-fault liability such as that in New Zealand is not
likely to be embraced by the United States. And despite the dire predictions
of the anti-strict liability forces, a causative liability regime is not analogous
to no-fault compensation. As dicussed earlier,"' no-fault compensation
schemes are normally extra-judicial mechanisms which employ a watered-
down standard of causation. The resulting tradeoff is a higher likelihood of
recovery in exchange for limited damages and restricted court access. By
contrast, under a causative liability regime, by contrast, traditional tort
causation principles remain intact, and plaintiffs continue to enjoy unfettered
access to courts.
VI. CAUSATIVE LIABILITY
The use of a reasonable prudence (i.e., negligence) standard to define
legal fault in products liability law is anachronistic and unjust. The
industrial revolution is over; with its demise, the need for a definition of
legal fault less rigorous than causative liability has evaporated. Products
liability law should return to its historical roots, where the focus is not on
why the accident happened, but who caused it. Under this causative liability
approach, the judge and jury are freed from the need to assess moral blame
and instead squarely face a more appropriate issue: deciding which party
should bear the burden of legal responsibility. Causation, a concept long
shrouded in secrecy and nonchalantly brushed aside as an unworkable
nebula, should be brought into the light. It should be the primary focus of
judges and juries in products liability actions. By facing and conquering the
multiheaded hydra of causation, products liability law can achieve sorely
needed uniformity and intellectual honesty.
Shifting the inquiry from reasonableness of conduct to causation of harm
will not deprive products liability law of the tort law foundation of fault.
Aristotle recognized long ago that causation can be considered coextensive
459. PFENNIGSTORF, supra note 408, at 53.
460. Id. at 167-68.
461. See supra notes 215-35 and accompanying text.
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with fault, stating that "it is often possible to ascertain one of two contrary
moral states from the other, or to ascertain moral states from their phenome-
na, i.e. from their causes and consequences.462  Similarly, under the
theory of causative liability, fault is implicit because the act caused harm.
One who acts in such a manner as to cause harm to another is at fault in a
legal (rather than moral) sense, and no special inquiry into reasonableness
is required. The uniform standard of causative liability fully captures the
Aristotelean notion of corrective justice,463 which holds:
It makes no difference whether it be a virtuous man who defrauded a bad
man, or a bad man who defrauded a virtuous man ... [t]he law looks only
to the degree of injury, it treats parties as equal, and asks only if one is the
author and the other the victim of injustice or if the one inflicted and the
other has sustained an injury. Injustice then in this sense is unfair or
unequal, and the endeavour of the judge is to equalize it.'
Focusing on causation also eliminates the need to pigeonhole a harmful
product into illogical categories of manufacturing, design, or informational
defect. A product that is the factual and proximate cause of harm is per se
defective and there is no need to subdivide products into categories of
defectiveness because the liability standard is uniform.
A. Cause-in-Fact (Factual Cause)
"Cause-in-fact," "factual cause," or "but for" causation, as every first-
year law student knows, is generally an indispensable requisite to recovery
in tort. It is the first head of the two-headed hydra of causation. The other
head, as will be discussed in later paragraphs, 465 is "proximate" or "legal"
cause, a policy tool designed to cut off liability for acts perceived as too
remote, attenuated, or mere conditions.
Cause-in-fact, as the name suggests, is a complex factual inquiry whose
goal is to decipher what events gave rise to the injury.' In the usual
case there are numerous causes-in-fact of the harm. 7  For example, if
462. ARISTOTLE, THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICs 143 (J.E.C. Welldon trans., 1987).
463. Corrective justice is the justice sought in disputes between private parties. Id.
at 154.
464. Id.
465. See infra notes 485-94 and accompanying text.
466. See Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60, 61
(1956).
467. See H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 69 (2d ed. 1985).
This phenomenon also explains the famous "two fires" hypothetical, in which two fires
combine to bum down the plaintiffs property. Although "but for" either fire, each fire alone
would be sufficient to cause the harm, the plaintiff is permitted to recover against the
defendant who set either fire because each fire is an independent factual cause of the harm.
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Jones dies of a gunshot to the head, the bullet and the gun are undeniably
factual, "but for" causes of Jones' unfortunate death. So, too, are the
resulting loss of blood, the killer's act, the killer's parents, the killer's great-
grandparents, all the way back to Adam and Eve-without them, Jones
would never have died. They are all necessary antecedents in the factual
chain of causation.
Causes-in-fact can be omissions rather than affirmative acts. For
example, the failure to pay attention to the road can be a cause-in-fact of an
accident. A lack of rain can be a factual cause of fire. Forgetting to water
flowers can cause them to wilt. The difficulty, of course, with these
omissions or negative causes is that- they require that the trier of fact
reconstruct a parallel series of facts in order to determine if, but for the
omission, the harm would not have occurred. 8 Thus, the trier of fact
must attempt to discern not just what actually happened but what would
have happened if the driver had paid attention to the road, the ramin had
come, or the flowers had been watered.
Although pinpointing factual causes is more difficult when an omission
brings about harm, it certainly can be done and, in fact, is done all the time.
The entire tort of negligence revolves around a failure to exercise reasonable
care. Most products liability actions involve a failure on the part of the
manufacturer to take certain safety precautions. Thus, criticizing causative
liability because of the difficulty of determining or limiting factual cause in
an omission to act case throws the baby out with the bath water. Tort law
often involves issues of negative causation, and juries and judges have
proven quite capable of employing traditional cause-in-fact analysis in such
cases. There simply is no reason to believe that the same inquiry cannot be
capably resolved in the products liability context.
As the reader will recall, the initial introduction to the discussion of
factual cause stated that it is generally a prerequisite to recovery. The word
"generally" was chosen with care. There are instances in tort law-
including products liability-in which proof of factual cause has been
declared unnecessary. The famous case of Summers v. Tice469 is a good
illustration.
In Summers, two hunters simultaneously shot at some quail using the
same kind of gun and the same kind of ammunition.47° In the process of
gunning for the quail, the plaintiff was struck in the eye and lip by two
birdshot pellets.47" ' The evidence presented at trial was inconclusive as to
468. ARNO C. BECHT & FRANK W. MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN
NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY CASES 21-25 (1961); HART & HONORE, supra note 467,
at 60-61; Malone, supra note 466, at 67.
469. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
470. Id. at 2.
471. Id.
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which hunter's birdshot lodged in the plaintiff's face. 472  The California
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to hold both defendants
jointly liable for the harm.473 In so holding, the court essentially dis-
pensed with the normal requirement that the plaintiff prove the defendant's
act was a cause-in-fact of the injury. Normally, if evidence is in equipoise
as to cause-in-fact, the plaintiff has not met his burden of proof, and
summary judgment will be entered for the defendant. But in Summers, the
evidence pointed equally to either hunter's birdshot being the factual cause
of harm, yet plaintiff still recovered.
An approach analogous to that of Summers has crept into products
liability law as well. For example, in the landmark case of Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories,4 4 the California Supreme Court imposed "market share" or
proportional liability on the manufacturers of DES, a prescription drug
designed to help prevent miscarriage which was later determined to cause
cancer in female offspring.4" Because of the long latency period between
exposure to DES and the appearance of cancer, the daughters who developed
cancer often faced insurmountable evidentiary hurdles to identifying which
of the 300 or so potential brands of DES their mothers had ingested.476
In response, the Sindell court dispensed with proof of cause-in-fact as to any
particular DES manufacturer and permitted recovery against each named
defendant based upon its proportional share of the relevant DES market.477
Thus far, market share liability has been confined primarily to DES
cases.478 Judicial hesitancy is warranted. After all, dispensing with proof
of factual cause is a slippery slope, descending straight into the abyss of
absolute liability. It does not take much imagination to conjure up
analogous products liability scenarios in which the plaintiff would have
difficulty pinpointing the manufacturer of the product that caused harm.
For example, a lamp purchased several years ago short-circuits, burning
beyond recognition. The injured plaintiff cannot remember where she
bought the lamp and has no idea who manufactured it. A can of beans
contains dangerous bacteria which results in illness several hours after
472. Id. at 3.
473. Id. at 5.
474. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
475. Id. at 925; see also Tentative Draft, supra note 26, § 5 cmt. c, at 107-08.
476. See Tentative Draft, supra note 26, § 5 cmt. c, at 108.
477. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936-38; see also Tentative Draft, supra note 26, § 5 cmt. c,
at 108.
478. See, e.g., Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164 (Mich.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 833 (1984); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 944 (1989); Martin v. Abbott Lab., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984); see also James A.
Henderson Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An
Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479, 492-93 (1990); but see Case v.




consumption. The plaintiff has discarded the can and the garbage collector has
hauled it away. The plaintiff cannot recall what brand of beans she consumed
and is unsure from which of the two grocery stores she regularly patronizes the
beans were purchased. A pair of pajamas ignites upon contact with a gas stove,
severely burning the plaintiff and rendering the pajamas unrecognizable. The
plaintiff had received the pajamas as a holiday gift from a relative now deceased.
He has no idea who manufactured the pajamas or where they were purchased.
Arguably, all of these hypotheticals would be ripe candidates for the
invocation of market share liability. Yet somewhere along the spectrum of
virtually innumerable defendants, most people viscerally cringe at the thought of
dispensing with proof of cause-in-fact. Of the hundreds or thousands of possible
lamp manufacturers, should each be required to compensate the plaintiff if she
cannot prove her injury was more probably than not caused by a particular lamp
manufacturer? The answer, for most people, is "no." The reason is that
proportional liability is tantamount to absolute liability. The lamp manufacturer,
bean manufacturer, and pajama manufacturer are transformed into insurers against
all lamp, bean, or pajama injuries, whether caused by their product or not.
By being forced to assume responsibility for injuries not within their control,
the manufacturers upon whom proportional liability is imposed become insurers
rather than warrantors of the safety of their own products.4' Market share
liability forces the manufacturer to assume the risk of actions of other manufactur-
ers of the same product, actions over which he has little knowledge and no
control. It also distorts market pricing by forcing safer products to internalize the
injury costs of more hazardous products. This distortion, in turn, leaves
consumers unable to make informed purchasing decisions and exacerbates the
nonmutuality of risk between manufacturer and consumer.
Under a causative liability regime, the imposition of proportional liability
would not be permitted. Plaintiffs would be required to prove, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that a named defendant's product was a cause-in-fact of the
harm. While this may seem harsh for plaintiffs who cannot pinpoint the
manufacturer whose product caused their harm, it is no more harsh than imposing
liability on a manufacturer whose product has not been proven to cause harm.
In such difficult cases, perhaps the best and most honest solution is to create
a statutory no-fault compensation scheme to assist plaintiffs who cannot meet
traditional tort causation standards of proof. Indeed, as discussed earlier, a
number of federal and state no-fault compensation schemes have already been
enacted to address precisely these kinds of proof problems. The Sindell court,
while undoubtedly attempting to achieve equity in a case involving a sympathetic
plaintiff, deviated from traditional tort principles and opened a Pandora's box of
potential problems ill-suited for judicial resolution.
Interestingly, the proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts takes no position on
market share liability for products but states that "[t]he Institute leaves to
developing law the question of whether, given the appropriate factors, a rule of
479. See GAF Corp. v. County Sch. Bd., 629 F.2d 981 (4th Cir. 1980).
480. See supra notes 215-35 and accompanying text.
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proportional liability should be adopted."'' It would be wiser to nip propor-
tional liability in the bud now; it is a deadly weed in the garden of tort law.
Another section of the proposed Restatement (Third) appears to adopt a
relaxed causation standard, but in fact does not. The proposed section dealing
with so-called crashworthiness litigation provides that a plaintiff who can prove
that a product was a substantial factor that caused his injury to be more severe
than it otherwise would have been can fully recover against the defendant unless
the evidence supports apportionment of harm.' This rule is in keeping with
the traditional tort principles regarding multiple individual causation; therefore, a
tortfeasor who causes any portion of the plaintiff's harm is liable for all of the
plaintiff's damages. 83 Only if the evidence supports apportionment between
the defendant and other causes of injury will the defendant be relieved of liability
for the entire harm.4 4 A cause is a cause is a cause, so the argument goes;
therefore, an action cannot be a partial cause unless the party with superior knowl-
edge (the defendant) can prove it. This permits the injured plaintiff to obtain full
recovery against any defendant who caused the harm unless the defendant can
prove that, in fact, he did not cause the entire harm. Thus, the crashworthiness
rule is not nearly so threatening to the notion of causation as market share
liability, which dispenses with proof of any causation.
Under causative liability, the crashworthiness doctrine would be permissible.
A plaintiff who could prove that the defendant's product was a cause-in-fact of
all or a portion of his injury would reach the jury, provided the other head of the
causation hydra, legal cause, did not prevent this result. A defendant who wished
to attempt to apportion his own responsibility for the plaintiff's injury would be
permitted to do so.
B. Proximate Cause (Legal Cause)
Dean Leon Green once keenly observed of proximate cause that "[n]o other
formula ... so nearly does the work of Aladdin's lamp." While its sibling
factual cause is a neutral, almost scientific inquiry, proximate or legal cause is
undeniably apolicy determination, anchored only by common sense and the quest
for fairness."86 Legal cause is really nothing more than a gatekeeping mecha-
nism whereby the trier of fact sifts through all possible factual causes and rejects
481. Tentative Draft, supra note 26, § 5 cmt. c, at 109.
482. Id. § 6, at 112.
483. See id. § 6 cmt. d, at 118-19; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A cmt.
i, 433B(2) (1965).
484. See Tentative Draft, supra note 26, § 6 cmt. d, at 118-19; see also Summers v.
Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
485. Leon Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEx. L. REv. 471,
471-72 (1950) (citation omitted).
486. HART & HONORE, supra note 467, at 24; Kenneth Vinson, Proximate Cause




those that are so microscopic, freakish, or otherwise attenuated that imposing
liability on the defendant would work injustice.
For example, the presence of oxygen is undoubtedly a cause-in-fact of
fire: but for oxygen, a fire could not exist.4"7 However, because oxygen
is always a necessary condition of fire, it is not appropriate to classify it as
a cause to which legal responsibility should be ascribed.48 While neces-
sary conditions such as oxygen are undeniably causes-in-fact, such condi-
tions should not be labelled "legal" causes simply because it would defy
common sense to apportion legal responsibility to them.
The importance of legal cause in a causative liability regime was
recognized many years ago by Justice Andrews in Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad Co.:
A murder at Serajevo [sic] may be the necessary antecedent to an
assassination in London twenty years hence. An overturned lantern may
bum all Chicago....
What we do mean by the word "proximate" is that, because of
convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law
arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This
is not logic. It is practical politics.489
Foreseeability of harm or use is often used as a proxy for achieving the
public policy and "rough sense of justice" referred to by Judge Andrews.
Unfortunately, foreseeability tends to distract the factfinder's attention from
the important policy decision of assigning legal responsibility for harm.
Some readers may consider the preceding sentence blasphemous. After
all, by definition, the trier of fact is just that-a trier of fact, not of policy.
But no one doubts that the current notion of proximate or legal cause is a
policy question, that it is normally defined by foreseeability, and that the
trier of fact normally makes the call. The problem with the current concept
of legal cause-the use of foreseeability as the penultimate proxy-is that
it clothes jury instructions in layer after layer of gobbledygook which sounds
a lot like a factual inquiry. In reality, however, triers of fact who determine
proximate cause are making complex policy decisions which define the
boundaries of the law. Telling the jury that they are to make a factual
determination as to whether the defendant's act created a foreseeable risk of
harm is misleading. It is akin to telling them that they must find Paris and
then giving them a map of Istanbul. It is no wonder they get lost.
In the products liability arena, the map given to the trier of fact is even
more obscure. The proxy for legal cause-foreseeability of harm-is further
limited by the notion of defect. Defectiveness is the tool designed to keep
487. HART & HONORE, supra note 467, at 34-35.
488. Id.
489. 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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products liability under control, to keep it within acceptable boundaries. But
requiring proof of both defect and foreseeability of harm has obscured the
core notion of legal cause almost beyond recognition. Causative liability
would revive the original role of legal cause-placing commonsensical,
policy-driven limits on liability-and would proudly bring it into the light
for the trier of fact to see.
The commonly accepted policy filter for sifting out insignificant causes-
in-fact is the substantial factor test. Under this test, "[t]he actor's negligent
conduct is a legal harm to another if his conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing [it] about.' '490 As the Restatement (Second) of Torts comments
confess, within the substantial factor test "there always lurks the idea of
responsibility, rather than in the so-called 'philosophic sense,' which
includes every one of the great number of events without which any
happening would not have occurred."49 Thus, the substantial factor test
is a policy evaluation which seeks to answer the question: Is the defendant's
act enough to justify pinning legal responsibility on him? Clearly, legal
cause, as defined by the substantial factor test, is a fluid concept incapable
of rigid definition. Legal cause will vary with the particular circumstances
of each case and, on a larger level, with the purpose for ascribing legal
responsibility.
492
Legal cause, as a policy tool, is malleable according to the perceived
purposes of tort law, including products liability. If the goal of products
liability is perceived as wealth maximization and optimum economic
efficiency, legal causation will be limited to those situations in which the
manufacturer could have avoided harm at lower cost than the injured
plaintiff.493 If, on the other hand, the goal of products liability law is
perceived as assigning responsibility in order to achieve corrective justice,
then legal cause is limited to those situations where the manufacturer
imposed on the consumer nonreciprocal risks which resulted in harm.494
Causative liability espouses the latter goal of products liability law.
VII. CONCLUSION
Causative liability has several benefits over both current law and the
proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts. First, and perhaps most importantly,
it is intellectually honest. It explicitly asks the triers of fact to make a
policy determination as to the relative legal responsibility of the defendants,
490. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
491. Id. § 431 cmt. a.
492. See HART & HONORE, supra note 467, at 62-63; John Borgo, Causal Paradigms
in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 419, 439-40 (1979).
493. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 29, at 13, 229.




rather than asking them to make such decisions using obscure surrogates
such as defect, risk/utility, or reasonableness of conduct. It acknowledges
the true nature of the jury's function and our faith in their ability to carry
out that function with their eyes open.
Second, a causative liability regime provides consumers with knowledge
of a product's risks by requiring internalization of costs for all harm caused
by the product. Armed with this knowledge, consumers can make more
intelligent and appropriate purchasing decisions. In essence, the marketplace
is freed to function as it should:- products reflect their true costs (but no
more), and consumers have knowledge. Internalization will give consumers
the opportunity to switch to safer substitutes if available. If safer substitutes
are not available, consumers at least have knowledge of the product's risks
and can intelligently determine for themselves whether to purchase the
product. If a product's market share dwindles, it is because consumers have
decided to avoid the risk. This is the free marketplace at its finest, not a
judicial ban of the product.
A third benefit of causative liability, closely related to internalization,
is restitution. While many have recognized that causative liability serves the
goal of compensation, rarely is it recognized that the goal of restitution is
just as significant in such a regime. A manufacturer under a negligence
regime who has sold his product to consumers at a price that fails to reflect
its hidden costs of harm is unjustly enriched when consumers purchase his
product without knowledge of the harm they face.495 The manufacturer
in a negligence regime has, in essence, been permitted to charge a distorted
price to induce greater sales. Thus, the manufacturer of a product which has
been on the market for a significant period of time in a negligence regime
may have been unjustly enriched to the tune of hundreds of millions of
dollars. A causative liability regime, via proper internalization of costs of
harm, would put an end to such unjust enrichment.
Finally, but not least significantly, a causative liability regime would
encourage greater product research and development. A manufacturer who
knows he will be held liable for harm proximately caused by his product
will clearly have ,a greater incentive to produce safe products than a
manufacturer who is held liable only for lack of due care. Under a
causative liability regime, the product manufacturer has an incentive to
discover latent dangers and to invest in research and development of safer
designs at an optimum rather than a minimum level.496 Judge Posner once
expressed it this way:
495. See Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier, supra note 11, at 1274
(confessing that a negligence regime permits products to enter the market "without reflecting
their true costs to society.").
496. See id. at 1274; see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 29, at 293 ("Under a
negligence standard the manufacturer will simply wait until the technology is developed;
strict liability will give him an incentive to foster its development.").
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By making the actor strictly liable-by denying him in other words an
excuse based on his inability to avoid accidents by being more careful-we
give him an incentive, missing in a negligence regime, to experiment with
methods of preventing accidents that involve not greater exertions of care,
assumed to be futile, but instead relocating, changing, or reducing (perhaps
to the vanishing point) the activity giving rise to the accident.
497
Thus, by disregarding the manufacturer's knowledge of harm and
focusing instead on whether the product caused harm, the judicial system
can essentially force product manufacturers to invest in the technology to
develop safer products when it is economically efficient for them to do
SO.498
This Article opened with the maxim, "accidents happen." Given that
accidents happen even when reasonable care has been exercised, the focus
of courts and legal scholars should be: What do we do about them? Which
of two arguably innocent parties should bear responsibility for the harm?
If both parties are morally innocent, can one party be considered legally at
fault? The great push for a return to negligence embodied in the proposed
Restatement (Third) of Torts would legitimize irrational and illogical
distinctions that leave well-schooled legal brains spinning in confusion. It
further distorts the inquiry, forcing future courts and academics into an
intellectual straightjacket from whence they may never escape. The
proposed Restatement (Third) is, in short, a giant step backwards, motivated
perhaps more by political ideology than reasoned legal theory. By adhering
to the elusive concept of defect and explicitly legitimizing the tripartite
paradigm of manufacturing, design, and informational defects, it freezes into
place distinctions without a difference. The time is ripe to rethink these
distinctions, to rethink the practical and historical purpose of tort law, and
to move forward, toward a unified theory of products liability, using logic,
fairness, and common sense as our guides. Causative liability is one
alternative that deserves careful consideration.
497. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th
Cir. 1990).
498. See MARSHALL S. SHAPO,. PRODUCTs LIABILrrY AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE
100-02 (1993).
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